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Abstract
Change defines the solar industry today. Photovoltaic (PV) panels have
become far more prevalent globally; prices have fallen precipitously; and
the rise of solar is causing shock waves throughout the electricity sector,
with advocates pushing for “grid parity” and incumbents fearing a utility
“death spiral.” Much attention has been paid to these shifts. Much less
focus has been put on the dramatic changes now taking place in the legal
instruments used to promote solar power. These changes are just as critical
— and are intrinsically intertwined with — the evolution of the solar energy
industry itself. As one set of commentators has observed, we may now be
observing the “emergence of the next generation of renewable electricity
policies.”
This Article aims to make sense of the myriad changes in solar energy
support policies worldwide. It identifies the four primary mechanisms used
to promote solar to date and traces the key changes that these laws are
rapidly undergoing. In so doing, the Article offers a critical roadmap for
understanding the recent past of solar support laws, and their potential
future. Specifically, the Article observes that the rapid changes to solar
support mechanisms derive directly from a fundamental tension at the center
of how these laws interface with the electricity system, and that because of
this tension, the recent changes to these laws are likely only to continue.
Three case studies — of Germany, Japan, and Nevada—are used to highlight
the broader lessons the Article offers.
Keywords: Solar energy, photovoltaics (PV), distributed generation (DG), grid
parity, death spiral, net metering, net billing, feed-in tariff, feed-in premium,
RPS, tender, tiering, banding, credit multipliers, Germany, Japan, Nevada

I. Introduction
Legal measures to promote solar power are no longer new. Since the 1970s,
nations across the world have adopted a wide variety of laws and policies to
encourage solar energy use, primarily for electricity production.1 Many jurisdictions
adopted these laws for reasons tied directly to longstanding energy policy objectives,
made all the more pressing by the challenges of the time, including: enhancing
domestic energy security, promoting electricity access, and reducing environmental
impacts.2 In the heat of this rush to capture the power of the sun, however, some
observers saw even greater potential, including the chance to entirely transform the
electricity system and thus forge a new and different energy future. As Amory
Lovins famously wrote in 1976, “Recent research suggests that a largely or wholly
solar economy can be constructed in the United States with straightforward soft
technologies that are now demonstrated and now economic or nearly economic.”3
For decades, Lovins’ observation continued to ring more as aspiration than
prophecy, both in the United States and for other nations. Yet in recent years, the
prospect of an electricity system transformed by solar power increasingly has come
to be seen less as distant dream and more as realistic possibility. While renewable
energy use continues to comprise only a small portion of overall energy production,4
it has begun to make significant inroads, and solar is no small part of this. Several
countries, including Denmark, Germany, and Scotland, recently have registered
days where they have produced enough electricity from renewables to cover virtually
their entire demand.5 Solar production itself has grown rapidly over the last decade,

1) See, e.g., S.M. Moosavian, Energy Policy to Promote Photovoltaic Generation, 25 Renewable
& Sustainable Energy Revs. 44 (2013); Felix Mormann, Enhancing the Investor Appeal
of Renewable Energy, 42 Envtl. L. 681 (2012); Felix Mormann, Requirements for a Renewables
Revolution, 38 Ecology L.Q. 903 (2011); K.H. Solangi, A Review on Global Solar Energy
Policy, 15 Renewable & Sustainable Energy Revs. 2149 (2011).
2) See generally Sanya Carley, Distributed Generation: An Empirical Analysis of Primary
Motivators, 37 Energy Pol’y 1648 (2009); cf., e.g., Uma Outka, Environmental Law and
Fossil Fuels: Barriers to Renewable Energy, 65 Vand. L. Rev. 1679 (2012).
3) Amory B. Lovins, Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken, 55 Foreign Aff. 65, 83 (1976).
4) See Lincoln Davies et al., Energy Law and Policy 100 (2014). BP Statistical Review of
World Energy, at 5 (June 2016), http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/energy-economics/
statistical-review-2016/bp-statistical-review-of-world-energy-2016-full-report.pdf
[hereinafter, BP Statistical Review].
5) Ian Johnston, Scotland Just Produced Enough Wind Energy to Power It for an Entire Day,
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tallying 1.1 percent of global electricity production in 2015 — a remarkable jump
from 0.3 terawatt hours (TWh) of production in 1989 to 185.9 TWh in 2014.6 And,
the prices of solar photovoltaic (PV) modules have fallen so precipitously — by
more than seventy percent over the last decade — that solar power appears poised to
change the electricity system even more.7
All this has led many observers to project that solar power now holds the potential
to disrupt the entire electricity industry, with some suggesting that the world is on
the cusp of a solar energy “revolution.”8 As one commentator has prognosticated,
“In the next 20 years, between 50 percent to 100 percent of the world’s energy
production could come from solar.”9 Solar, then, in more ways than one, is the
emerging star of the global electricity scene.

6)
7)
8)

9)

Independent (Aug. 10, 2016), http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/scotland-wind
-energy-renewable-power-electricity-wwf-scotland-a7183006.html.
BP Statistical Review, supra note 4.
Solar Industry Data: Solar Industry Growing at a Record Pace, Solar Energy Industries Ass’n,
http://www.seia.org/research-resources/solar-industry-data (last visited Sept. 21, 2016).
Peter Diamandis, Solar Energy Revolution: A Massive Opportunity, Forbes, Sept. 9, 2016,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterdiamandis/2014/09/02/solar-energy-revolution-a-m
assive-opportunity/#176ff26b2066; see also, e.g., Giles Parkinson, Why Energy Experts
Are Still Shocked by the Rise of Solar & the Fall in Costs, Clean Technica (Apr. 15, 2016),
https://cleantechnica.com/2016/04/15/why-energy-experts-are-still-shocked-by-the-ris
e-of-solar-the-fall-in-costs/; Nathan Richter, Is Rooftop Solar Finally Good Enough to
Disrupt the Grid?, Harv. Bus. Rev. (May 21, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/05/is-rooftop–solar
-finally-good-enough-to-disrupt-the-grid; Rebecca Smith, Pumped Up: Renewables Growth
Revives Old Energy-Storage Method, Wall St. J., July 22, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/ articles/
pumped-up-renewables-growth-revives-old-energy-storage-method-1469179801;
Angela Macdonald-Smith, ‘It’s the End of Energy and Transportation as We Know It’: Tony
Seba, Sydney Morning Herald, May 24, 2016, http://www.smh.com.au/business/energy/ itsthe-end-of-energy-and-transportation-as-we-know-it-tony-seba-20160519-goz5bm.html.
Peter Diamandis, Disrupting Solar, Huffington Post (May 8, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/peter-diamandis/disrupting-solar_b_9865216.html; see also, e.g., David Frankel et
al., The Disruptive Potential of Solar Power, McKinsey Q. (Apr. 2014), http://www.mckinsey.com/
business-functions/sustainability-and-resource-productivity/our-insights/the-disruptiv
e-potential-of-solar-power (“[N]ew solar installations could now account for up to half
of new consumption . . . .”); Andrew Freedman, The Renewable Energy Revolution Is
Already Upon Us, Mashable (Feb. 4, 2016), http://mashable.com/2016/02/04/renewable
-energy-revolution/#HGYtPIS0wSq1.
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Figure 1: Share of Non-Hydro Renewable Energy Capacity and Production from Solar10

While solar energy increasingly has gained the spotlight as a potentially
disruptive technology, much less attention has been paid to the changing nature of
legal and policy tools used to promote this resource. This gap in the literature is
critical, because there is a dynamic relationship between legal instruments adopted
to promote solar energy and the shape, substance, and stability of those tools. Solar
power’s growth has come as production costs for PV panels have plummeted, new
and innovative financing mechanisms have taken hold, and other soft costs have
fallen, particularly as learning by doing has expanded along with the solar market.11

10) Data derived from International Renewable Energy Agency.
11) Mark Bolinger & Joachim Sel, Lawrence Berkeley Nat’l Lab., Utility-Scale Solar 2015: An
Empirical Analysis of Project Cost, Performance, and Pricing Trends in the United States,
at ii (Aug. 2016), https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/lbnl-1006037_report.pdf; David Feldman
et al., Ernest Orlando Lawrence Berkeley Nat’l Lab., Photovoltaic (PV) Pricing Trends:
Historical Recent and Near-Term Projections 2-3 (Nov. 2012), http://escholarship.org/uc/
item/06b4h95q; Naim R. Darghouth et al., Net Metering and Market Feedback Loops:
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At the same time, the legal and policy instruments adopted to promote solar have
begun to evolve along with, and in direct response to, these and other shifts in the
electricity sector.12 As the affordability of solar has increased over the last decade,
so too has the speed of this legal adaptation.
Indeed, dramatic changes in the legal instruments used to promote solar power
have begun to crop up — and take hold — across the globe. As one set of commentators
has observed, the changes in renewable energy law are so extensive today that the
world may already be “witnessing the emergence of the next generation of renewable
electricity policies,” with the corresponding effect that “policy labels themselves are
breaking down and evolving.”13 The rapid evolution of the legal and policy instruments
designed to support solar energy are an important, telling microcosm of this broader
trend. Accordingly, the time is ripe to help make sense of what is happening in the
crucially important legal landscape of solar energy support mechanisms.
This Article aims to aid in this understanding, by mapping traditional solar energy
support regimes, the changes they are undergoing, and what their future paths may
be. It introduces the primary legal tools that historically have been used to promote
solar power use, surveys the types of changes these laws have already faced, and uses
cases studies of Germany, Japan, and Nevada to illustrate the implications of these
changes as they unfold in practice.
Specifically, this Article observes that the recent, rapid changes to solar support
mechanisms derive directly from a fundamental tension at the center of how these
laws interface with the electricity system: policymakers’ desire to alter the system,
and incumbent utilities’ natural incentive to resist that change. Because of this
tension, the types of changes these laws have undergone should not be surprising.
They are becoming both more market-oriented and more amalgamated in how they
Exploring the Impact of Retail Rate Design on Distributed PV Deployment, 162 Applied
Energy 713 (2016); Giles Parkinson, Solar Costs Will Fall Another 40% In 2 Years. Here’s
Why., Clean Technica (Jan. 29, 2015), https://cleantechnica.com/2015/01/29/solar-costswill-fall-40-next-2-years-heres/; Robert Wand & Florian Leuthold, Feed-in Tariffs for
Photovoltaics: Learning by Doing in Germany?, 88 Applied Energy 4387 (2011).
12) See Ranjit Deshmukh et al., Changing Sunshine: Analyzing the Dynamics of Solar Electricity
Policies in the Global Context, 16 Renewable & Sustainable Energy Revs. 5188, 5193-97
(2012); Govinda R. Timilsina et al., Solar Energy: Markets, Economics and Policies, 16
Renewable & Sustainable Energy Revs. 449, 462 (2012); Kiran Torani et al., Innovation
Subsidies Versus Consumer Subsidies: A Real Options Analysis of Solar Energy, 92 Energy
Pol’y 255, 255-69 (2016).
13) See Toby D. Couture et al., Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab., The Next Generation of Renewable
Electricity Policy: How Rapid Change Is Breaking Down Conventional Policy Categories,
at v (Feb. 2015), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy15osti/63149.pdf.
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are constructed. Moreover, it is almost certain that these laws will continue to rapidly
change, in part because of the fundamental tension in how they operate, and in part
because the underlying industry is bound to continually evolve. Consequently, a key
imperative for lawmakers going forward will be managing how they alter these
support mechanisms over time. At the same time, the solar industry should not expect
these laws to remain static, but instead, should find ways to work cooperatively with
lawmakers — and to be prepared to adapt to rapidly evolving legal frameworks.
Four parts comprise the balance of the Article. Part II details the significant legal
instruments used to promote solar energy use since the 1970s. Part III identifies and
describes the key changes occurring in these policies, including the recent evolution
of some longstanding legal tools into quite different policy mechanisms. Part IV
explores the experience of jurisdictions that have made these changes, focusing
particularly on the cases of Germany, Japan, and Nevada. That Part then analyzes
these experiences, identifying emerging tensions, trends, and lessons that other
jurisdictions across the globe may take from them. Part V concludes.

ɇ. TRADITIONAL SOLAR SUPPORT MECHANISMS
Nations adopt legal support regimes for solar power resources for a variety of
reasons. While this Article focuses on support instruments for solar power electricity
production, which primarily consists of PV panels but increasingly also includes
concentrating solar power (CSP),14 it bears mention that some jurisdictions also
have chosen to support use of solar resources for heating services as well.15
At a broad scale, states promote solar power for many of the same reasons that they
choose to encourage use of renewable energy resources more generally. One of the
most prominent of these is that renewables, including solar, tend to be more
environmentally friendly than traditional energy resources, especially fossil fuels.16
14) I. Perez, A. Lopez, S. Bricenɫo & J. Relancio, National Incentive Programs for CSP – Lessons
Learned, 49 Energy Procedia 1869, 1870-78 (2014).
15) R. Guédez et al., Optimization of Thermal Energy Storage Integration Strategies for Peak
Power Production by Concentrating Solar Power Plants, 49 Energy Procedia 1642, 1647-50
(2014).
16) See generally Joseph P. Tomain, Ending Dirty Energy Policy: Prelude to Climate Change
(2011); A.K. Akella et al., Social, Economical and Environmental Impacts of Renewable
Energy Systems, 34 Renewable Energy 390, 391(2009); Gary C. Bryner, The National
Energy Policy: Assessing Energy Policy Choices, 73 U. Colo. L. Rev. 341, 342 (2002);
Lincoln L. Davies, Beyond Fukushima: Disasters, Nuclear Energy, and Energy Law, 2011
BYU L. Rev. 1937, 1975-78 (2011); Ned Farquhar, Energy, Security, Climate: Converging

88

Making Sense of the Rapidly Evolving Legal Landscape of Solar Energy Support Regimes
Lincoln L. Davies

Producing electricity from coal, for instance, yields in excess of 2,500 pounds per
billion BTU of particulates and SO2, and nearly 500 pounds of NOx.17 By contrast,
using solar resources to generate the same amount of electricity produces none of this
same criteria air pollution.18 Likewise, as climate change has become a growing
concern, solar power has gained a brighter luster in the eyes of governments seeking
to quell this global dilemma.19 This is because producing electricity with coal creates
more than 200,000 pounds of CO2 pollution per billion BTU, with electricity
production from oil yields nearly 175,000 pounds and natural gas produces almost
125,000 pounds.20 But solar is an effectively zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emission
fuel.21
What has stopped solar from competing with other electricity generation fuels,
then, is not its environmental performance, but rather, other factors. These include,
most significantly, its comparatively high cost, but also engineering quandaries,
including the fact that solar is a non-dispatchable, intermittent resource, and that
electricity systems have been designed generally to deliver power from large,
dispatachable, centralized resources rather than from small-scale, distributed generation
such as residential rooftop PV.22
Nonetheless, nations have chosen to promote solar both for its favorable
environmental attributes as well as other energy policy reasons. Notably, the first
real push to promote solar energy came in the wake of the oil crises of the 1970s,
underscoring that at least some jurisdictions have long seen solar power as a possible

17)
18)
19)
20)
21)
22)

Solutions, 29 J. Land Resources. & Envtl. L. 1 (2009); Hannah Wiseman et al., Formulating
a Law of Sustainable Energy: The Renewables Component, 28 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 827
(2011); Union of Concerned Scientists, Benefits of Renewable Energy Use, http://www.ucsusa.org/
clean-energy/renewable-energy/public-benefits-of-renewable-power#.WEUFXIWcGM8
(last visited Dec. 4, 2016).
See Davies et al., supra note 4, at 127.
See id.
See, e.g., The Solar Revolution, in Lester R. Brown et al., The Great Transition: Shifting from
Fossil Fuels to Solar and Wind Energy 67 (2015).
See Davies et al., supra note 4, at 127.
See id.
See, e.g., Andrew Satchwell et al., Quantifying the Financial Impacts of New-Metered PV
on Utilities and Ratepayers, 80 Energy Pol’y 133, 142-43 (2015); David Berry & Amanda
Ormond, An Unstable State: Conflict and Institutional Change in the Electric Industry, 28
Elec. J. 63, 63-73 (Mar. 2015); Matt Croucher, Optimal Deployment of Solar Index, 23 Elec.
J. 75, 75-81 (Nov. 2010); Andrea Sarzynski et al., The Impact of State Financial Incentives
on Market Deployment of Solar Technology, 46 Energy Pol’y 550, 551-57 (2012).
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solution to energy security concerns.23 More recently, some states have begun to see
solar power as a possible economic boon. Characterized in different terms — including
the most common moniker, “green growth”24 — these jurisdictions believe that
solar power provides a key avenue to job creation and broader economic growth in
a more sustainable way,25 particularly as the electricity sector is decarbonized.26
Another justification for promoting solar relates to this resource’s ability to be
used at a small, distributed scale. Unlike other renewables, such as large wind
turbines, solar can be deployed far more modularly, including on homes and
businesses, as shade in parking lots, and in a myriad other micro applications. This
largely sets solar power apart from other renewable energy resources and is part of
the reason it gets so much political, governmental, and popular attention.27
Indeed, many benefits get attributed to solar power specifically because it is a
distributed generation resource. First, the fact that solar can be used directly by
electricity consumers creates a perception that solar power promotes energy democracy.28

23) See Jonatan Pinkse & Daniel van den Buuse, The Development and Commercialization of
Solar PV Technology in the Oil Industry, 40 Energy Pol’y 11, 12 (2012). Notably, some
observers trace the birth of energy law as a field to this same time period. See, e.g., Kenneth
A. Manaster, An Introductory Analysis of Energy Law and Policy, 22 Santa Clara L. Rev.
1151, 1151, 1158 (1982).
24) See generally, e.g., Korea Legislation Research Institute, Research on Local Governments’
Green Growth Legislation (2013); Statistics Korea, Korea’s Green Growth based on OECD
Green Growth Indicators 3-7 (March 2012).
25) Martin Jänicke, “Green Growth”: From a Growing Eco-industry to Economic Sustainability,
48 Energy Pol’y 13, 13-16 (2012); Luis Mundaca et al., Towards a Green Energy Economy?
Assessing Policy Choices, Strategies and Transitional Pathways, 179 Applied Energy 1283,
1283-92 (2016).
26) See generally, e.g., Tomain, supra note 16; Sanya Carley, Decarbonization of the U.S. Electricity
Sector: Are State Energy Policy Portfolios the Solution?, 33 Energy Econ.1004 (2011).
27) For more on solar power as a distributed resource, see, e.g., Lori Bird et al., Nat’l Renewable
Energy Lab. & Regulatory Assistance Project, Regulatory Considerations Associated with
the Expanded Adoption of Distributed Solar 8-18, 49 (2013); Richard L. Revesz & Burcin
Urcel, Managing the Future of the Electricity Grid: Distributed Generation and Net
Metering, NYU School of Law, Public Law & Legal Theory Research Series, Working Paper
No. 16-09 (Feb. 19, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2734911;
Jeff Winmill, Electric Utilities and Distributed Energy Resources—Opportunities and
Challenges, 6 San Diego J. of Climate & Energy L. 199, 204-09 (2015).
28) Cf. Benjamin K. Sovacool & Pascale L. Blyth, Energy and Environmental Attitudes in the
Green State of Denmark: Implications for Energy democracy, Low Carbon Transitions, and
Energy Literacy, 54 Envtl. Sci. & Policy 304, 304-15 (2015).
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This appeals to those who value ideas of populism as well as disruptive innovation.
Second, many argue that solar power can make the electricity grid itself both more
efficient and more secure — more efficient because using electricity at the source
can cut down on distribution costs and infrastructure investments, and more secure
because when electricity is used locally there is less room for breakdowns in a
sprawling system.29 Finally, many jurisdictions also have begun to view solar as a
way to solve the problem of energy poverty.30 Because solar panels can be easily
installed and do not necessarily rely on the presence of a distribution grid,
encouraging use of solar in remote and rural areas is one way that electricity can be
more cheaply brought to the seventeen percent of the global population that now
lacks access to this basic modern lifeblood.31
Given the promise of these benefits from solar power, many nations have adopted
legal tools aimed at promoting the technology. While the context, contour, and
specific content of these laws vary, often quite substantially, from one jurisdiction
to the next, they can be placed into four core categories: (1) net metering laws; (2)
feed-in tariffs; (3) tradable certificate regimes, also known as renewable portfolio
standards or renewable obligations; and (4) tax and other financial incentives. Figure
2 details the overall growth of renewable energy support regimes over the past
decade.

29) Lovins, supra note 3, at 79, 84.
30) See, e.g., Johannes Urpelainen, Energy Poverty and Perceptions of Solar Power in Marginalized
Communities: Survey Evidence from Uttar Pradesh, India, 85 Renewable Energy 534
(2016).
31) International Energy Agency, Energy Access Database, http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/
resources/energydevelopment/energyaccessdatabase/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2016); F.S. Javadi
et al., Global Policy of Rural Electrification, 19 Renewable & Sustainable Energy Revs. 402,
413 (2013); T.R. Ayodele & A.S.O. Ogunjuyigbe, Increasing Household Solar Energy
Penetration Through Load Partitioning Based on Quality of Life: The Case Study of Nigeria,
18 Sustainable Cities & Soc’y 21, 26-31 (2015).
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Figure 2: Jurisdictions with Renewable Energy Support Policies32

A. Net Metering
Net metering first took hold in the early 1980s in the United States.33 Adopted in
1978, the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) sought to encourage

32) Data is derived from the annual Renewables Global Status Reports of the Renewable Energy
Policy Network for the 21st Century. Because nation-specific data is not available for some
years for these categories, Figure 2 shows data for “states/provinces/countries” for both the
“RPS / Quota Policies” and “Feed-in Policies” categories. Thus, as each subnational policy
is counted as a data point for these categories, these two policies are overrepresented in
Figure 2; this over-representation is much greater for RPSs/quotas than it is for feed-in
policies. Nonetheless, Figure 2 provides a sense of how quickly different policy mechanisms
have grown over time.
33) Sanya Carley & Lincoln L. Davies, Nevada’s Net Energy Metering Experience: The Making
of a Policy Eclipse?, Report for Brookings Inst., Brookings Mountain West (November
2016).
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greater use of renewables for electricity production in a variety of ways, including
by compelling incumbent utilities to purchase electricity from so-called renewable
energy “qualifying facilities.”34 Inspired by PURPA, “some states decided to take
[this idea] one step further by including net metering as an option for smaller
generators.”35 Soon, a number of states had net metering (NEM) laws in place.
The idea of net metering is straightforward. “Net metering is a billing mechanism
that credits solar energy system owners for the electricity they add to the grid.”36
Specifically, when an electricity consumer also produces electricity, she receives
credit for that power production — up to a limit. The limit is that the customer cannot
receive this credit for more than the amount of electricity she consumes in a given
time period. Thus, the term “net” in “net metering” implies how these laws function.
It reminds that customers are credited only for their net energy production —
nothing more.37
While the basic idea of net metering is relatively simple, its application can be
more complicated. One set of commentators has identified no fewer than four
primary types of net metering laws.38 First, there is “simple net metering,” which
functions in the way described above: “[T]he customer-generator uses a single,
bi-directional meter to record the amount of electricity banked[, and] the banking
period . . . is confined to one billing period.”39 Second, a jurisdiction might adopt “net

34) Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 2, 92 Stat. 3117, 3119
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 2601ದ2645 (2006)).
35) Yih-huei Wan & H. James Green, Current Experience with Net Metering Programs, Green
Power Network, at 2, http://apps3.eere.energy.gov/greenpower/resources/pdfs/current_nm.pdf
(last updated Mar. 2004).
36) Solar Energy Industries Ass’n, Issues & Policies: Net Metering, http://www.seia.org/policy/
distributed-solar/net-metering (last visited Sept. 9, 2016).
37) For instance, a NEM customer might consume 200 kWh of electricity in a month. She might
also produce 75 kWh from a PV system on her home’s rooftop. Of that 75 kWh, she may
directly consume 25 kWh but not need the other 50 kWh at the time the electricity is
produced. That 50 kWh of power, then, will flow back to the grid. Accordingly, if this
customer is participating in a net metering program, she will receive credit for 50 kWh of
production and be billed for 125 kWh of consumption from the utility: that is, 200 kWh of
total consumption less 25 kWh of direct consumption from the PV system less 50 kWh of
electricity supplied to the grid.
38) Larry Hughes & Jeff Bell, Compensating Customer-Generators: A Taxonomy Describing
Methods of Compensating Customer-Generators for Electricity Supplied to The Grid, 34
Energy Pol’y 1532, 1533 (2006).
39) Id. at 1535.
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metering with buy-back.”40 In this model, the utility pays (rather than credits) the
NEM customer for all “excess electricity generated during the billing period.”41
Third, “net metering with rolling credit” operates as does simple net metering, except
that the credit for excess electricity production is allowed to be banked over a period
of time longer than a single billing cycle.42 Finally, under “net metering with rolling
credit and buy-back,” the extra production is credited and rolled over from one
billing cycle to the next. However, at the end of this banking period, the utility buys
any remaining credited electricity from the NEM customer and “settles up” the
account.43
Irrespective of the specific version of net metering, an important feature of
traditional NEM programs is that the level of compensation or credit is made at the
same price that the customer otherwise would have paid to purchase electricity from
the utility. That is, NEM compensation traditionally has been made at the full retail
price of electricity.44 Many commentators suggest that this design feature is essential
to NEM laws, because it incentivizes customer participation.45 Without this level of
support, customers would have no monetary reason to produce their own power,
because buying electricity from the incumbent utility would remain a less expensive
option.46
The use of retail prices to compensate NEM customers highlights a key difference
with other solar support mechanisms. Net metering specifically aims to encourage
distributed generation. Whereas other legal tools seek to foster renewables use more
generally, or even to encourage specific resources but at any size of project, NEM
sets its sights directly on customer-generated power, which by default is often
small-scale PV.47
Once introduced into the United States, these programs quickly grew. The
40)
41)
42)
43)
44)
45)
46)

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
E.g., Carley, supra note 2; Carley & Davies, supra note 33.
See Carley & Davies, supra note 33.
A further justification is that compensating NEM customers at the retail price is equitable:
It means, or at least some observers suggest, that distributed power can compete on the same
playing field as electricity provided by utilities. Locally produced distributed power is
consumed locally (on-site or immediately nearby), so from a policy perspective, utilitygenerated and customer-generated electricity should be treated as economic equivalents. See id.
47) Giovanni S. Saarman González, Evolving Jurisdiction Under the Federal Power Act:
Promoting Clean Energy Policy, 63 UCLA L. Rev. 1422, 1426 (2016).
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Arizona Public Utilities Commission started net metering there in 1981, and
Minnesota adopted a NEM statute in 1983.48 By 1998, a total of twenty U.S. states
had “enacted net metering laws or regulations,” and two other states had utilities that
adopted NEM programs on their own.49 Today, forty-one states plus the District of
Columbia have mandatory net metering policies in place; two states (Idaho and
Texas) have no statewide mandate but utility-specific NEM programs; and four
states have distributed generation rules other than net metering.50
Net metering has also spread worldwide. While some established solar markets,
including Belgium and Denmark, “are moving away from net-metering . . . , emerging
PV markets are expected to set up net-metering schemes,” with recent announcements
of new NEM programs in Chile, Dubai, Lebanon, Ontario (Canada), and some
Indian states.51 Thus, sixteen percent of the global PV market was driven by net
metering or other consumer self-consumption laws in 2014,52 and over fifty nations
now have some kind of net metering law on the books.53

B. Feed-in Tariffs
Structurally, feed-in tariffs, or “FITs,” are quite similar to net metering programs.
They differ, however, both in the amount of support they provide to solar resources
and the way they give that support. That is, rather than simply crediting a customer
who produces electricity from solar or other renewables, feed-in tariffs compensate
the producer for that production — traditionally, at a set, premium level of payment.54
These laws thus seek to encourage new entry into the electricity generation market
by entities other than those who have historically supplied power.55

48) Wan & Green, supra note 35, at 7-8.
49) Id. at 7-9.
50) Database of State Incentives for Renewable Energy & Efficiency, Net Metering (July 2016),
http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Net_Metering1.pdf.
51) Int’l Energy Agency Photovoltaic Power Sys. Programme, Trends 2015 in Photovoltaic
Applications 10 (20th ed. 2015), http://www.iea-pvps.org/fileadmin/dam/public/report/
national/IEA-PVPS_-_Trends_2015_-_MedRes.pdf.
52) Id. at 33.
53) Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century, Renewables 2016 Global Status
Report 20 (2016), http://www.ren21.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/GSR_2016_Full_Report
_REN21.pdf [hereinafter, REN21 2016].
54) See Lincoln L. Davies, Incentivizing Renewable Energy Deployment: Renewable Portfolio
Standards and Feed-In Tariffs, 1 Kor. Legis. Res. Inst. J. of L. & Legis. 39 (2011).
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Feed-in tariffs have four key design components. First, they offer a premium
payment for the production of renewables. The payment level generally varies
depending on the type of renewable resource in question. A FIT will use one price
for solar PV, for instance, and a different price for onshore wind.56 Second, FITs
mandate that incumbent utilities allow eligible producers to connect to the grid.57
This aspect of feed-in tariffs aims directly at breaking down a traditional barrier to
entry in the industry.58 Third, FITs require that the full amount of energy produced
from eligible sources be purchased.59 Deemed a critical innovation of feed-in tariffs,
this feature serves a dual purpose, both breaking down a barrier to entry and
providing FIT producers certainty by eliminating the risk of needing to find a buyer
for their power.60 Fourth, feed-in tariffs guarantee compensation for a given period
of time.61 This time period varies, but it is often ten, fifteen, twenty, or even
twenty-five years.62 The idea is to assure producers that the electricity market is
worth getting into. A guaranteed period of remuneration provides predictability and
55) See, e.g., Fed. Ministry for the Env’t, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety, EEGಧThe
Renewable Energy Sources Act: The Success Story of Sustainable Policies for Germany 4,
13 -14 (2007) [hereinafter, BMU, EEG].
56) See, e.g., Jonathan A. Lesser & Xuejuan Su, Design of an Economically Efficient Feed-In
Tariff Structure for Renewable Energy Development, 36 Energy Pol’y 981 (2008).
57) See, e.g., Lincoln L. Davies, Reconciling Renewable Portfolio Standards and Feed-In
Tariffs, 32 Utah Envtl. L. Rev. 311 (2012).
58) See, e.g., BMU, EEG, supra note 55, at 13-14; Joel B. Eisen, Residential Renewable Energy:
By Whom?, 31 Utah Envtl. L. Rev. 339 (2011).
59) See, e.g., Brian Jansen, Community Wind Power: Making More Americans Energy Producers
Through Feed-In Tariffs, 20 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 329, 330 (2011).
60) See, e.g., C. Mitchell et al., Risk, Innovation and Market Rules: A Comparison of the
Renewable Obligation in England and Wales and the Feed-In System in Germany, at 20,
http://www.worldfuturecouncil.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Miguel/Bauknecht_Mitchell_
Connor__2002__Risk__Innovation_and_Market_Rules_-_A_Comparison_of_the_RO_a
nd_the_EEG.pdf.
61) See, e.g., Carlos Battle et al., Regulatory Design for RES-E Support Mechanisms: Learning
Curves, Market Structure, and Burden-Sharing, MIT Ctr. for Energy and Envtl. Policy
Research Working Paper 2011-011, at 2 (May 2011), http://web.mit.edu/ceepr/www/
publications/workingpapers/2011-011.pdf; Toby Couture & Yves Gagnon, An Analysis of
Feed-In Tariff Remuneration Models: Implications for Renewable Energy Investment, 38
Energy Pol’y 955 (2010).
62) Paul Gipe, Snapshot of Feed-in Tariffs around the World in 2011, Renewable Energy World
(Oct. 6, 2011), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/articles/2011/10/snapshot-of-feedin-tariffs-around-the-world-in-2011.html.
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reduces risk.63 In this way, FITs effectively function like government-backed
investments.64
These and other design features differentiate feed-in tariffs from net metering
programs. Perhaps the most essential difference between these laws is that FITs pay
generators for the full amount of the power they produce, rather than only crediting
them up to the amount they consume. This highlights FITs’ objective of transforming
the electricity market by bringing new and different competitors into the fray. At the
same time, there is a strong dividing line between FITs and NEM programs because
FITs typically encompass all kinds of renewable energy production, whereas NEM
regimes are focused on small-scale, distributed power at the retail customer level.
Finally, FIT and NEM programs differ in how they compensate energy production.
Whereas NEM compensation is based on the bundled retail rate of electricity, the
modern FIT aims to pay producers for the going cost of technology, plus a reasonable
return on their investment.65 This design feature seeks to make FITs efficient, by
assuring that customer-producers are not overcompensated.66
There is some dispute about where the first feed-in tariff was instituted. PURPA,
adopted in 1978 in the United States,67 is a clear ancestor of modern feed-in tariffs.68
But it only required incumbent utilities to purchase renewables output at the so-called
“avoided cost” they otherwise would have had to pay for acquiring the same amount
of generation.
Only two years later, in 1980, Spain adopted a law that even more closely
resembled the modern feed-in tariff. That nation’s Law 82/198069 also sought
specifically to support renewable energy production, but it took PURPA’s design
one step further, by imposing not only a price premium and a purchase mandate but

63) Toby Couture et al., Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab., Policymakers’ Guide to Feed-in Tariff
Policy Design (July 2010), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/44849.pdf.
64) Lincoln L. Davies & Kirsten Allen, Feed-in Tariffs in Turmoil, 116 W. Va. L. Rev. 937, 1003
(2014).
65) David Jacobs, Fabulous Feed-in Tariffs, 11 Renewable Energy Focus 28 (2010).
66) See Couture & Gagnon, supra note 61, at 962.
67) Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act § 2, 92 Stat. 3117, 3119.
68) See, e.g., Lesser & Su, supra note 56, at 982; Jim Rossi, The Limits of a National Renewable
Portfolio Standard, 42 Conn. L. Rev. 1425, 1436 (2010); Michael E. Streich, Comment,
Green Energy and Green Economy Act, 2009: A “FIT”-ing Policy for North America?, 33
Hous. J. Int’l L. 419, 429 (2011).
69) Ley 82/1980, de 30 de desembre, sobre conservació d’energia [Law on the Conservation of
Energy] (B.O.E. 1980, 1898), available at http://www.boe.es/boe_catalan/dias/1981/
12/31/pdfs/A00005-00009.pdf.
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addressing network connection as well.70
While the pioneering efforts of Spain and the United States were critical in the
development of feed-in tariffs, the law often recognized as the direct progenitor of
modern FITs is the 1990 German statute, Stromeinspeisegesetz (StrEG).71 This law,
which translates roughly as “electricity feed-in law,” lent modern FITs their name.72
Like the 1980 Spanish law, the StrEG addressed network connections and guaranteed
a premium price for renewable energy production.73 It also offered historically
generous levels of compensation, based — akin to NEM programs — on a percentage
of “the average revenues earned by the network operators from sales to all final
electricity consumers” during the prior year.74
Importantly, over time, the StrEG regime began to evolve. In 1993, the western
German city of Aachen began offering a solar feed-in tariff based on technology
costs plus a return-on-investment adder, rather than retail costs as the StrEG had.75
This development, which soon became known as the “Aachen model,”76 was
deemed “revolutionary” for tying solar remuneration to technology costs rather than
external forces.77 It quickly took off in other German cities,78 and in 2000 was
70) Davies & Allen, supra note 64, at 968 (“Specifically, under the 1980 law, renewable
generators received a price for their electricity, set by the Ministry of Energy and Industry
and paid by the utilities, for any power produced beyond the facility’s needs”); see also Pablo
del Río González, Ten Years of Renewable Electricity Policies in Spain: An Analysis of
Successive Feed-In Tariff Reforms, 36 Energy Pol’y 2917, 2918 (2008).
71) See Rainer Hinrichs-Rahlwes, Sustainable Energy Policies for Europe: Towards 100%
Renewable Energy 30 n.12 (2013). The StrEG was adopted in 1990 but took effect in 1991.
72) Id.
73) See Paul-Georg Gutermuth, Regulatory and Institutional Measures by the State to Enhance
the Deployment of Renewable Energies: German Experiences, 69 Solar Energy 205, 207
(2000); Volkmar Lauber & Lutz Mez, Three Decades of Renewable Electricity Policies in
Germany, 15 Energy & Env’t 3 (2004), available at http://www.windworks.org/cms/uploads/
media/Three_decades_of_renewable_electricity_policy_in_Germany.pdf.
74) David Jacobs, Renewable Energy Policy Convergence in the EU: The Evolution of Feed-in
Tariffs in Germany, Spain and France 176 (2012). Unlike NEM programs, however, these
rates varied depending on the type of renewable resource used to produce electricity. See id.
at 176-77; Lauber & Mez, supra note 73, at 1.
75) Pembina Institute, Cities Leading Global Renewable Energy Boom, in Renewable Energy
Fit for Cities: Making Renewable Energy a Priority, at 2 (2010), available at http://www.
pembina.org/pub/2133.
76) Paul Gipe, All About Solar Energy: The Aachen Solar Tariff Model, Wind-Works (Apr. 7,
2007), http://www.wind-works.org/cms/index.php?id=38&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=
227&cHash=e088827563342ea235137c8e2e5f7cf6.
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imported into the new national renewable energy support law, the ErneuerbareEnergien-Gesetz (EEG).79 That law then brought to full fruition what we now know
as a modern feed-in tariff. It offered a price premium tied to technology costs,
mandated purchase and interconnection, and guaranteed remuneration to renewables
producers for twenty years.80 The importance of this new structure was quickly
recognized and broadly acclaimed. As one set of commentators noted as early as
2004, “The most important German [renewable energy] promotion measure in the
area of electricity is without any doubt the . . . EEG . . . .”81
In the wake of Germany’s adoption of the EEG in 2000, feed-in tariffs swept the
globe. By 2010, at least forty-eight countries had national feed-in tariffs in place,
with three more using subnational or regional FITs.82 Today, 110 jurisdictions use
FITs,83 and feed-in tariffs are responsible for almost 59 percent of solar energy
production — and historically have accounted for nearly 65 percent of all solar
production.84 The role of the feed-in tariff in promoting solar, then, cannot be
understated. In terms of legal support mechanisms for this resource, FITs long have
been the giant in the field.

C. Tradable Certificate Regimes / Renewable Portfolio Standards
For many years, jurisdictions seeking to promote renewables chose either FITs or
the mirror-image counterpart to FITs, the renewable portfolio standard (RPS).85 The
RPS goes by many names. Depending on the jurisdiction, it is also known as a
77) Id.
78) Lauber & Mez, supra note 73, at 6; Stefanie Hallberg, On the Way to a CO2NeutralCity—
TheExampleofAachen, Goethe Institut, http://www.goethe.de/ges/umw/prj/kuk/the/arc/
en9664671.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).
79) Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz [EEG] [Renewable Energy Sources Act], March 29, 2000,
Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBL. I] at 305, § 8 (Ger.) [hereinafter, EEG 2000], available at
http://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/bundesrecht/eeg/gesamt.pdf (German) and http://www.
erneuerbare-energien.de/fileadmin/ee-import/files/pdfs/allgemein/application/pdf/resact.
pdf (English).
80) EEG 2000, supra note 79, at 305, §§ 3, 5, 8, 9; see Volkmar Lauber & Lutz Mez, Renewable
Electricity Policy in Germany, 1974 to 2005, 26 Bull. of Sci., Tech. & Soc’y 105, 110 (2006).
81) Mischa Bechberger & Danyel Reiche, Renewable Energy Policy in Germany: Pioneering
and Exemplary Regulations, 8 Energy for Sustainable Dev. 47, 52 (2004).
82) David Jacobs, supra note 65, at 28, 29.
83) Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century, supra note 53, at 19.
84) Int’l Energy Agency Photovoltaic Power Sys. Programme, supra note 51, at 33.
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“tradable certificate” regime, a “tradable green certificate” regime, a “renewables
obligation,” a “renewable purchase obligation,” a “renewable energy standard” or
“renewable electricity standard,” or, sometimes, a “clean energy standard” or renewable
energy “quota.”86
Despite the wealth of monikers employed to refer to these laws, they share several
common features. The first is that they mandate that utilities within the jurisdiction
achieve a specified target of electricity production by a date certain.87 Typically,
RPSs do this by requiring utilities to produce a percentage of their power from
renewables, but sometimes they instead simply mandate that a specified level of
renewables be installed by a statutory deadline.88 Second, these laws generally
create some kind of tradable permit regime to demonstrate compliance with the law.
These are usually called renewable energy credits or renewable energy certificates
(RECs), although they are also referred to as green certificates (GCs) or tradable
green certificates (TGCs).89 Finally, these laws include a variety of different enforcement
mechanisms.90 These can range from penalties for failure to comply to alternative
compliance payments (ACPs) that can be made in lieu of renewable energy production,
to pre-planning requirements for utilities to coordinate with regulators, to post facto
reporting mandates to show compliance.91
RPSs stand apart from both net metering and feed-in tariffs in an important way.
RPSs, at least as initially adopted, generally did not target solar power specifically.
Rather, the very concept of an RPS is that an overarching renewable energy production
target will be met, and any resource defined as renewable under the statute will
qualify toward meeting that target. The idea is that by creating a separate market for
renewables, the competitive playing field will be leveled.92 Thus, unless modified

85) See Pablo del Río & Pere Mir-Artigues, Combinations of Support Instruments for Renewable
Electricity, 40 Renewable & Sustainable Energy Revs. 287 (2014).
86) Lincoln L. Davies, Evaluating RPS Policy Design: Metrics, Gaps, Best Practices, and Paths
to Innovation, 4 Kor. Legis. Res. Inst. J. of L. & Legis. 3, 9 (2014).
87) See id. at 9-11; see also, e.g., Joshua P. Fershee, Changing Resources, Changing Market: The
Impact of a National Renewable Portfolio Standard on the U.S. Energy Industry, 29 Energy
L.J. 49 (2008).
88) Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 Conn. L. Rev.
1339 (2010).
89) See Davies, supra note 86, at 9-11.
90) See id.
91) See Davies, supra note 88; see also, e.g., Greg Buckman, The Effectiveness of Renewable
Portfolio Standard Banding and Carve-Outs in Supporting High-Cost Types of Renewable
Electricity, 39 Energy Pol’y 4105, 4111 tbl. 11 (2011).
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in their design, RPSs effectively tend to support a single type of renewable resource
— the lowest cost one. In many jurisdictions, this meant that RPSs generally supported
wind development, because historically this was often the most cost efficient
renewable resource.
Even though traditionally RPSs did not single out solar power for special
compensatory treatment as NEM and FIT regimes do, these mandates still have
played an important role in encouraging solar energy use. In fact, according to the
International Energy Agency, over four percent of solar production has occurred in
response to the trading of green certificates or similar RPS-based regimes.93 Moreover,
as RPSs have continued to evolve in recent years, they increasingly have included
solar-specific measures.94
Globally, RPSs have not been quite as popular as feed-in tariffs, and some
jurisdictions in fact have abandoned RPSs in order to adopt FITs.95 Still, renewable
obligations are one of the most common policies used worldwide for promoting
renewables, with one hundred jurisdictions currently employing them.96

92)
93)
94)
95)

See Buckman, supra note 91.
Int’l Energy Agency Photovoltaic Power Sys. Programme, supra note 51, at 33.
See infra Part III.C.
Peng Sun & Pu-yan Nie, A Comparative Study of Feed-in Tariff and Renewable Portfolio
Standard Policy in Renewable Energy Industry, 74 Renewable Energy 255, 261 (2015);
Anton Ming-Zhi Gao et al., Sustainable Photovoltaic Technology Development: Step-by-Step
Guidance for Countries Facing PV Proliferation Turmoil Under the Feed-in Tariff Scheme,
43 Renewable & Sustainable Energy Revs. 156, 157 (2015).
96) Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century, supra note 53, at 19. This figure
refers to both national and subnational RPSs. Only about thirty nations have national or
subnational RPSs, although many more, especially in the European Union, use TGCs. See
id. at 118-20. Reliance on RPSs is particularly important in the United States. Thirty-seven
states plus Washington, D.C. have RPSs in place, in part because the national Congress has
failed to adopt climate change legislation. Given that the future of the Obama
administration’s Clean Power Plan remains in doubt, these state laws are particularly
important for the future of renewable energy in the United States. Database of State
Incentives for Renewable Energy & Efficiency, Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies (Aug.
2016), http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Renewable
-Portfolio-Standards.pptx; see Adam Liptak & Coral Davenport, Justices Deal Blow to
Obama Effort on Emissions, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 2016, at A1. See generally, e.g., Barry G.
Rabe, Pew Center Global Climate Change, Race to the Top: The Expanding Role of U.S.
State Renewable Portfolio Standards (2006), http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/
RPSReportFinal.pdf; Kevin L. Doran, Can the U.S. Achieve a Sustainable Energy Economy
from the Bottom-Up?: An Assessment of State Sustainable Energy Initiatives, 7 Vt. J. Envtl.
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D. Tax and Financial Incentives
The final category of legal tools used to promote solar energy is also the largest
and most diverse. Across the globe, jurisdictions employ a wide variety of tax and
other financial incentives to reduce the cost barrier to solar.97 These include
“capital-based (i.e. per watt of installed capacity) incentives or rebates, tax incentives
(investment tax credits and production tax credits), grants, interest subsidies or
low-cost financing, and loan guarantees.”98 Within these broad categories, the
variations and gradations of detail are almost limitless. Indeed, one study estimates
that over 200 such policies are currently in effect throughout the world.99
Because the objective of these measures is to reduce the cost of using solar, two
key dilemmas arise. The first is how significant the financial incentive will be. The
second is related: How much will the incentive cost ratepayers or the public? This
matters because “most of these and other forms of subsidies are financed from either
electric ratepayer charges and/or taxpayer monies.”100
Tax credits are among the most popular of these mechanisms, and they may
function in several ways. The investment tax credit affords a person or entity that
installs PV panels a break on their tax bill.101 For instance, beginning in 1978, the
United States offered a thirty percent tax credit for expenditures on solar electricity
production equipment, a significant driver for renewable energy installations over

L. 95, 107 (2006); Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in
Environmental Law, 56 Emory L.J. 159 (2006); Daniel A. Farber, Climate Change,
Federalism, and the Constitution, 50 Ariz. L. Rev. 879 (2008); Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal
Federalism and Climate Change Implications for the Obama Administration, 62 Ala. L.
Rev. 237 (2011).
97) See, e.g., hereinafter, REN21 2016, supra note 53, at 18; Moosavian, supra note 1.
98) Ranjit Deshmukh et al., Changing Sunshine: Analyzing the Dynamics of Solar Electricity
Policies in the Global Context, 16 Renewable & Sustainable Energy Revs. 5188, 5190
(2012).
99) Int’l Energy Agency, IEA/IRENA Joint Policies and Measures Database, https://www.iea.org/
policiesandmeasures/renewableenergy/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2016).
100) Deshmukh et al., supra note 98, at 5190; see also, e.g., U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Direct
Federal Financial Interventions and Subsidies in Energy in Fiscal Year 2013 (2013),
https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/subsidy/pdf/subsidy.pdf.
101) Felix Mormann, Beyond Tax Credits: Smarter Tax Policy for A Cleaner, More Democratic
Energy Future, 31 Yale J. on Reg. 303, 314-315 (2014); Tracey M. Roberts, Picking
Winners and Losers: A Structural Examination of Tax Subsidies to the Energy Industry, 41
Colum. J. Envtl. L. 63, 98-100 (2016).
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time.102 By contrast, a production tax credit reduces the tax bill of the system owner
based not on how much they invest in the system, but rather, on how much qualifying
electricity they produce from it.103 This tax mechanism, too, has been seen as critical
in the United States, with boom-and-bust cycles arising whenever the credit expires
or that possibility of the credit lapsing crops up.104 Globally, both types of tax credits
are popular in part because they do not require a direct outlay of funds from the
government. According to the Renewable Energy Policy Network, fifty-two countries
currently have some type of renewable energy tax credit in place.105
Grants and other types of subsidies operate similarly to investment and production
tax credits but are financed differently. Rather than reducing government tax income,
they are paid directly using government funds. They are extremely popular.
“Subsidies are the primary instrument to support solar energy development in almost
every country in the world.”106 India offers a good example of how such incentives
function. There, the government has offered a production-based subsidy that combines
with a feed-in tariff to offer roughly Rs. 15/kWh, with higher levels of compensation
for rural electrification programs and families below the poverty line.107 Globally,
fifty-nine countries use grants, subsidies, or similar tools to encourage installation
of renewables.108
Governments may also seek to break down barriers to solar use by facilitating the
financing of projects, particularly in rural areas or for lower income citizens.
“Micro-credit . . . has been used as a model for initiating community energy projects
(particularly in Latin America, Africa and South Asia), while at the same time
addressing poverty by increasing energy access.”109 In 2003, for instance, Spain
initiated a program to give low-interest loans for solar thermal applications.110
102) Govinda R. Timilsina et al., Solar Energy: Markets, Economics and Policies, 16 Renewable
& Sustainable Energy Revs. 449, 458 (2012).
103) Mormann, supra note 101, at 313-15; Roberts, supra note 101, at 95-98.
104) See 26 U.S.C. § 45 (2015); Am. Wind Energy Ass’n, Wind Energy for a New Era: An
Agenda for the New President and Congress 8 (2009), available at https://web.archive.org/
web/20120321190236/http://www.newwindagenda.org/documents/Wind_Agenda_Rep
ort.pdf; Ryan Wiser et al., Using Federal Production Tax Credit to Build a Durable Market
for Wind Power in the United States 5 (2007).
105) REN21 2016, supra note 53, at 18.
106) Timilsina et al., supra note 102, at 458.
107) Id.
108) REN21 2016, supra note 53, at 119-21.
109) Id. at 139.
110) Timilsina et al., supra note 102, at 459
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Bangladesh similarly launched a microcredit financing program that resulted in
nearly one million installs of solar home systems between 2003 and 2011.111
On a global scale, governmental subsidies and tax breaks have played an undeniably
important role in promoting solar. They account for almost twenty percent of the PV
market historically, and roughly sixteen percent of PV installations in 2014.112

Ɉ. THE RAPIDLY EVOLVING LEGAL LANDSCAPE
OF SOLAR SUPPORT MECHANISMS
Following their inception forty years ago, most legal support mechanisms for
solar stayed relatively unchanged over the years, quietly helping PV and related
technologies occupy their small, sleepy corner of the energy industry. Over the last
decade, however, a virtual revolution in solar has begun. Growth of solar has
exploded, with PV increasing from under 15 GW of global installed capacity in 2004
to nearly 180 GW in 2014.113 At the same time, the legal and policy instruments used
to promote solar also have undergone rapid and extensive transformation. It is no
coincidence that these two trends emerged in tandem. They are intrinsically interrelated.
As the solar power market has changed, so too have the legal instruments used to
promote this resource, shifting and adapting in response to the altered technological
and economic landscape.
By far, the most staggering change in solar power over the last decade is the
precipitous decline in module costs. In 1978, the price of a solar panel in the United
States was nearly $77/watt. By 2006, that price had dropped to roughly $4/watt.
Since then, the price has fallen further still — almost tenfold — with a recorded price
of $0.49/watt in July 2016.114
Moreover, these drops in solar costs have altered where solar is installed. “In
2008, Spain fueled market development while Europe achieved more than eighty
percent of the global market: a performance repeated until 2010.”115 Only six years
111)
112)
113)
114)

Id.
Int’l Energy Agency Photovoltaic Power Sys. Programme, supra note 51, at 32.
Id. at 8.
Galen Barbose & Naim Darghouth, Lawrence Berkeley Nat’l Laboratory, Tracking the Sun
VIII: The Installed Price of Residential and Non-Residential Photovoltaic Systems in the
United States 1 (Aug. 2015), https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/lbnl-188238_2.pdf; Zachary
Shahan 13 Charts On Solar Panel Cost & Growth Trends, Clean Technica (Sept. 4, 2014),
https://cleantechnica.com/2014/09/04/solar-panel-cost-trends-10-charts/.
115) Int’l Energy Agency Photovoltaic Power Sys. Programme, supra note 51, at 12.
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later, all that has changed. Asia now accounts for roughly a third of the global market,
and the Americas are rapidly increasing their solar market share as well.116 Thus, in
2014, China led the world in PV installations, representing twenty-seven percent of
all projects, with Japan following at twenty-four percent, the United States in third
at sixteen percent, and no other country accounting for more than six percent of the
market.117
At the same time, the types of solar projects being built has shifted, with
grid-connected and centralized large projects now dominating the scene — a stark
change from only fifteen years ago when distributed PV was the most popular. In
2000, nearly eighty percent of installations worldwide were grid-connected
distributed generation, with the remainder of installs coming from off-grid resources.
Since 2007, however, off-grid resources have essentially fallen off the map,
accounting for only a sliver of global PV installations, while utility-scale installations
have outstripped the growth of distributed solar. In 2015, for instance, utility-scale
centralized solar projects made up more than sixty percent of the global market,
grid-connected distributed generation comprised almost the entire balance, and
off-grid projects barely registered.118
Figure 3: Solar Installations by Type119

116)
117)
118)
119)

Id. at 10.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 10-11.
This figure is reprinted with permission from Int’l Energy Agency Photovoltaic Power
Systems Programme, Trends 2016 in Photovoltaic Applications: Survey Report of Selected
IEA Countries Between 1992 and 2015, at 12 (2016), http://iea-pvps.org/index.php?id
=3&eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=3390.

KLRI Journal of Law and Legislation VOLUME 6 NUMBER 2, 2016

105

These rapidly changing trends in solar deployment cannot be separated from the
legal tools used to promote the technology. Until only recently, global drops in solar
prices were a direct result of the wide adoption of feed-in tariffs in Europe, which
achieved their goal of driving costs down by enhancing economies of scale and
building efficiencies in soft costs, particularly by learning through doing.120 Indeed,
Europe’s pioneering solar policy efforts, namely through FITs, helped entice new
players into the PV manufacturing market, including China.121 The resulting shift in
installations from Europe to other parts of the globe directly tracked the modification
of support regimes in that region, particularly as feed-in tariffs were diluted or
abandoned.122 Understanding what changes are occurring in the support regimes for
solar, then, is critically important. It helps explain the market, and it identifies ways
in which these legal tools are, or are not, working.
Overall, four recent trends in changes in the legal and policy support tools for solar
can be observed worldwide. First, some jurisdictions have begun considering — and
implementing — alterations to their net metering regimes, both to reduce compensation
to NEM customers and to increase fees levied on them. Second, feed-in tariffs have
rapidly and significantly evolved, with some countries putting strict limits on their
regimes, others fundamentally transforming them, and others still abandoning them
outright. Third, many jurisdictions using RPSs have updated their laws in an effort
to promote solar. These changes include creating solar-specific tiers, adopting solarspecific targets, and giving extra credit for solar installations. Fourth, there has been
a rise in the use of tendering regimes worldwide, which has helped promote larger
solar projects.
Importantly, not all these trends cut in the same direction. Shifts away from FITs,
120) Barbose & Darghouth, supra note 114, at 2; see also, e.g., Robert Fares, The Price of Solar
Is Declining to Unprecedented Lows, Sci. Am., Aug. 27, 2016, http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/
plugged-in/the-price-of-solar-is-declining-to-unprecedented-lows/; Katie Fehrenbacher,
Solar Is Going to Get Ridiculously Cheap, Fortune, June 13, 2016, http://fortune.com/
2016/06/13/solar-to-get-crazy-cheap/; Chip Register, Solar Continues Trumping Fossil
Fuel Pricing, With More Innovations to Come, Forbes, Sept. 11, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/
sites/chipregister1/2014/09/11/solar-continues-trumping-fossil-fuel-pricing-with-more-i
nnovations-to-come/#2a347bde232f .
121) Dawei Liu & Hideaki Shiroyama, Development of Photovoltaic Power Generation in
China: A Transition Perspective, 25 Renewable & Sustainable Energy Revs. 782, 788-89
(2013); see also Mo-lin Huo & Dan-wei Zhang, Lessons from Photovoltaic Policies in
China for Future Development, 51 Energy Pol’y 38, 39 (2012).
122) Davies & Allen, supra note 64, at 1003-05; Pablo del Río González, Ten Years of
Renewable Electricity Policies in Spain: An Analysis of Successive Feed-in Tariff Reforms,
36 Energy Pol’y 2917, 2928 (2008).
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for instance, can reduce incentives for distributed solar, but solar-specific tenders
might expand overall use of the resource. Further, the various changes to solar
support schemes often interact, almost like a chemical reaction. For example,
reductions in or limits on compensation in NEM schemes might on their own hinder
small-scale solar deployment in the short-term, but inclusion of solar-specific targets
in RPSs might dampen that effect, or at least encourage larger-scale projects that
otherwise might not have been built.
It is imperative, then, to recognize that the various changes occurring in policies
to promote solar are not independent. Indeed, while much of the scholarship to date
has addressed changes to individual policies separately, a key contribution of this
Article is the observation that these legal shifts are occurring simultaneously, in
response to many of the same forces. Detailing how and why that is occurring, and
what its implications are, is the primary objective of Part IV. First, however, it is
necessary to describe the changes that have so quickly emerged in these laws.

A. NEM . . . to NEB?
The United States provides direct insight to the type of changes that net metering
schemes have begun to undergo. In 2015, twenty-seven jurisdictions in the United
States took regulatory action on their net metering policies.123 Of these, three states
— California, Hawaii, and Nevada — adopted successor regimes to their prior net
metering laws.124 Almost immediately, this sent waves throughout the solar community,
prompting one prominent report to ask whether the alteration of these regimes
represented “the beginning of the end of net metering.”125
The question is legitimate. Twenty-four states in the U.S. “formally examined or
resolved to examine some element of the value of solar or distributed generation
more broadly” during 2015.126 The reasons given for doing so ranged widely, from
aiming to better educate regulators, to improving integrated resource planning, to

123) North Carolina Clean Energy Technology Center & Meister Consultants Group, The 50
States of Solar: 2015 Policy Review and Q4 Quarterly Report, 13, 17 (Feb. 2016)
[hereinafter 50 States of Solar].
124) Id. at 17.
125) Id. For more on NEM changes in other countries, see, e.g., Rodolfo Dufo-Lopez & Jose L.
Bernal-Agustiɩn, A Comparative Assessment of Net Metering and Net Billing Policies.
Study Cases for Spain, 84 Energy 684 (2015); David Watts et al., Potential Residential PV
Development in Chile: The Effect of Net Metering and Net Billing Schemes for Grid-Connected
PV Systems, 41 Renewable & Sustainable Energy Revs. 1037 (2015).
126) 50 States of Solar, supra note 123, at 19.
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examining cost concerns for net metering itself.127 No matter how they are categorized,
these changes carry potentially significant implications.
Utilities and regulators have put a bright spotlight on NEM programs specifically
because solar growth in recent years has been so rapid. As a result, the core concern
from utilities is the erosion of their customer base and the loss of sufficient revenues
to build and maintain the grid.128 At the same time, ratepayer advocates worry that
the increasingly high penetration of solar is now unfairly shifting costs from solar
NEM users to non-NEM customers, and is inequitably benefitting wealthy ratepayers
at the expense of the poor.129 As a primary tool for promoting distributed solar in the
United States, net metering thus has become a key target for possible policy change.
The target on NEM programs is both wide and diverse. One strategy that utilities
have begun employing to challenge traditional net metering is proposing charges
specifically applicable to customers who have installed distributed solar.130 These
charges can come in a variety of versions, including demand charges, standby fees,
and fixed monthly fees. Overall, twenty-one utilities in thirteen U.S. states proposed
solar-specific charges in 2015.131 Although only one investor-owned utility succeeded
in having its proposed charge adopted, two large municipal utilities as well as one
cooperative and one state-owned utility unilaterally imposed solar-specific fees on
their customers.132 These charges are not insignificant. The median proposed demand
charge was $4.80/kW-month,133 and the highest proposed flat monthly fee was
$21.134 While most such proposals failed, the frequency with which utilities have
begun asking for them is a strong signal that efforts to reform net metering may only
be heating up.
In addition to solar-specific charges, utilities and regulators have been challenging
the basic architecture of NEM programs. The heart of traditional net metering is that
the NEM customer receives compensation at the full retail price of electricity for any
excess energy they produce.135 However, some utilities and lawmakers have begun

127) See id. at 20.
128) Kenneth W. Costello & Ross C. Hemphill, Electric Utilities’ ‘Death Spiral’: Hyperbole or
Reality?, 27 Elec. J. 7, 12-19, 22-23 (Dec. 2014).
129) See Carley & Davies, supra note 33.
130) 50 States of Solar, supra note 123, at 17.
131) Id.
132) See id. at 29-33.
133) See id. at 29-33.
134) Id. at 32.
135) See Carley, supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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proposing that this traditional aspect of NEM regimes be replaced with one of two
different pricing mechanisms.
First, some utilities have advocated for “buy all, sell all” arrangements rather than
traditional net metering. Under such schemes, customers purchase all of their
electricity needs from their local utility at the full retail price of power.136 They then
sell all of the solar energy they produce back to the utility, either at the utility’s
avoided cost of obtaining additional electricity or at the so-called “value of solar”137 —
that is, the avoided cost of energy acquisition plus a premium for pollution
avoidance.138 Utilities urge that such arrangements are superior to traditional net
metering because, by decoupling distributed generation production from consumption,
they ensure that the utility can recoup its full costs of providing service while also
adequately and fairly compensating the NEM customer. Already, Minnesota as well
as utilities in Louisiana and Texas have begun using such “value of solar” tariff
programs in lieu of traditional net metering.139
Second, a practice of using the same crediting structure of net metering but
changing the compensation level from retail prices to avoided cost rates has
emerged. This program design, which is typically referred to as “net billing” (NEB)
because it does not treat electricity produced by a net metering customer on a
one-to-one basis with electricity consumed by the customer,140 has already been
instituted in Hawaii and Nevada as well as by one utility in Louisiana.141 Indeed,
Louisiana is currently considering whether to replace net metering entirely with
NEB, and Mississippi recently adopted net billing as its first effort to promote
distributed solar power. Many solar advocates thus see NEB as a direct and growing
threat to traditional NEM, both because it substantially reduces compensation for
solar and because it appears to be gaining traction.
Together, these two reforms are sometimes referred to as “NEM 2.0.”142 That is,
136) Mike Taylor et al., Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab., Value of Solar: Program Design and
Implementation Considerations 9 (Mar. 2016), www.nrel.gov/publications.
137) Herman K. Trabish, A Rising Tension: ‘Value-of-Solar’ Tariff Versus Net Metering,
Greentech Media (Apr. 10, 2014), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/ARising-Tension-Within-the-Solar-Industry-Value-of-Solar-Versus-NEM.
138) Taylor et al., supra note 136.
139) 50 States of Solar, supra note 123, at 17.
140) Dufo-Lopez & Bernal-Agustiɩn, supra note 125, at 685.
141) 50 States of Solar, supra note 123, at 17.
142) Amparo Nieto, Optimizing Prices for Small-scale Distributed Generation Resources: A
Review of Principles and Design Elements, 49 Elec. J. 31, 39 (2016); Karl R. Raɩbago, The
Value of Solar Tariff: Net Metering 2.0, at 45, 47-49 (ICER Chronicle 1sted., 2013).
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they are typically seen as a complete reboot of existing net metering regimes, taking
those laws in a new and different direction. There is truth in this claim. Buy-all,
sell-all arrangements look much more like a moderated form of a feed-in tariff than
a traditional NEM program, and NEB regimes closely resemble PURPA avoided
cost schemes that historically have been used to support larger facilities rather than
small-scale distributed resources. Importantly, moreover, proposals for these reforms
are closely tied to the fact that NEM schemes have begun meeting their aggregate
program caps.143 While, so far, most states have either left their NEM caps in place
or have increased them over time,144 as solar continues to grow, the technology will
only continue to butt up against these ceilings, in turn making it yet more likely that
calls for changes to some form of NEM 2.0 will repeat — and grow.

B. FIT . . . to FIP?
Just as the defining feature of NEM regimes is their use of retail rates to compensate
producers, the historical promise of FITs was predictability through price stability.145
Indeed, it is this feature that long caused many observers to praise FITs as superior
to RPSs in terms of both efficacy and efficiency.146 Because FITs send such a
predictable signal to the market, the theory goes, they provide a stronger incentive
than RPSs for renewables deployment. Likewise, when producers can count on the
level of remuneration they will receive, they assume less risk, making FITs more
cost-effective as well.147

143) 50 States of Solar, supra note 123, at 17.
144) Id. at 16.
145) See, e.g., Philippe Menanteau et al., Prices Versus Quantities: Choosing Policies for
Promoting the Development of Renewable Energy, 31 Energy Pol’y 799, 811 (2003); Janet
L. Sawin, National Policy Instruments: Policy Lessons for the Advancement and Diffusion
of Renewable Energy Technologies Around the World, Thematic Background Paper, at 4
(Jan. 2004), prepared for the International Conference on Renewable Energies, Bonn,
Germany, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20101221222510/http://wind-works.org/
FeedLaws/SawinWorldWatchTBP03-policies.pdf.
146) See, e.g., Mary Jean Bürer & Rolf Wüstenhagen, Which Renewable Energy Policy Is a
Venture Capitalist’s Best Friend?: Empirical Evidence from a Survey of International
Cleantech Investors, 37 Energy Pol’y 4997, 4999 (2009).
147) See, e.g., Couture et al., supra note 63, at 16-18, 50-67; Sadie Cox & Sean Esterly, Nat’l
Renewable Energy Lab., Feed-in Tariffs: Good Practices and Design Considerations: A
Clean Energy Regulators Initiative Report, (Jan. 2016), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy16osti
/65503.pdf; Davies, supra note 54, at 64-65.
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That, at least, was the theory. As it turns out, many feed-in tariffs have been so
effective at promoting renewables deployment that lawmakers have felt compelled
to modify these regimes in an effort to keep program costs under control.148 The
problem, of course, is that by changing FIT regimes, the very stability and predictability
for which they have been praised is undermined. Nonetheless, the evidence is clear
that feed-in tariffs — perhaps more than any other solar support mechanism — continue
to go through extensive and repeated alterations, so much so that several commentators
have suggested these laws now risk being in constant “turmoil.”149
While the iterations of changes to FITs are extensive, in all there are four primary
categories of substantive changes they have undergone. First, many jurisdictions
have simply changed feed-in tariff rates, typically decreasing them to match
declining technology costs. In 2011, for instance, both Italy and the United Kingdom
cut FIT rates because the prior level of compensation was deemed too generous.150
Such changes can be made either prospectively or retroactively. Obviously, the latter
option is seen as more disruptive, but both versions have been received quite critically
in the renewables community.
Second, some countries have placed caps on their feed-in tariffs programs, so that
once a given installation target is hit, the program ends. A related modification is to
put in place temporary, or “floating” ceilings, so that the FIT either temporarily
disappears or is substantially reduced when its target is reached. For instance, in
2009, Germany introduced the concept of the atmender Deckel, or “breathing cap,”
which does just this for its solar PV tariff.151 The idea is elegant. In order to ensure
that PV growth develops in a measured rather than explosive way (and thus, that it
contains potential program costs), the tariff reduces whenever the PV target is
exceeded, but stays constant if growth does not outstrip the desired level of
installations.152
Third, many FIT jurisdictions have begun building so-called “degression” into
their tariff rates. That is, rather than designing a FIT to provide a stable level of
compensation over time, these laws now plan for technology costs to decrease, and
thus put in place a declining rate from the outset.153 Spain, for instance, instituted this
in its PV feed-in tariff in 2008, and France followed suit in 2011.154 The benefit of

148)
149)
150)
151)
152)
153)

See Davies & Allen, supra note 64, at 1003-05.
See id.; Deshmukh et al., supra note 98; Gao et al., supra note 95, at 157.
Gao et al., supra note 95, at 160.
See Davies & Allen, supra note 64, at 955.
See id.
Gao et al., supra note 95.
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building in degression is that it may help avoid overpayment to eligible producers,
thus also making the regime more cost-effective. On the flip side, the risk is that
degression will either be too steep (and under-incentivize installations) or not steep
enough (and give windfall profits to producers). Degression may be a step in the right
direction, but it is not a complete solution. While governments are becoming
increasingly adept at understanding renewables markets, perfect foresight is impossible.
Fourth, a number of FIT jurisdictions have taken various measures to tie their
tariffs to the market. Some have made this choice voluntary for eligible producers,
or have built incentives into their FIT regimes to encourage producers to choose to
sell into the market rather than only taking the tariff payment.155 Other jurisdictions,
however, have transformed their laws so that they are no longer traditional feed-in
tariffs at all. Most prominent among these adaptations is the so-called “feed-in
premium,” or “FIP.”156 Like a FIT, a feed-in premium mandates purchase of the
power, guarantees access to the grid, and ensures payment over a long period of time.
Unlike a FIT, however, a FIP does not specify a price in advance. Instead, it provides
a premium payment on top of the spot market price. This premium can attempt either
to (1) account for the costs of externalities avoided by using renewables or (2) more
closely track falling renewable technology costs.157 In recent years, FIPs have begun
to catch on. As of 2010, for instance, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, the
Netherlands, Slovenia, and Spain all offered some kind of FIP.158
That FIPs are now available may seem rather unremarkable, but it is not. This
change — combined with the others, as well as the choice by some jurisdictions to
abandon FIT programs altogether159 — underscores just how fragile FIT systems
can be. Indeed, given that feed-in tariffs became so popular in the first place
specifically because they tied compensation directly to technology costs, one must
question whether jurisdictions that now use FIPs have made a choice to actually turn
away from traditional FITs, or rather, are simply a reflection of a natural (and perhaps
unavoidable) course of the FITs’ evolutionary process.

154) See id. at 160.
155) See Couture et al., supra note 63, at 22-23.
156) See Lena Kitzing, Renewable Energy Policies in Europe: Converging or Diverging?, 51
Energy Pol’y 192, 193 (2012).
157) Couture et al., supra note 63, at 50.
158) A. Klein, Feed-in Tariff Designs: Options to Support Electricity Generation from Renewable
Energy Sources (2008).
159) See Davies & Allen, supra note 64, at 984-99.
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C. RPS Bands, Carve-outs, and Multipliers
Although the basic theory of RPSs is to promote renewables at the lowest cost,
these laws increasingly have been adapted over time to promote specific resources
as well. For solar, three forms of modification to a standard RPS are relevant: RPS
bands or tiers, resource-specific carve-outs, and credit multipliers.
An RPS that is banded or tiered is likely to vary the most in terms of how directly
it supports solar development. The idea of banding is to break up the RPS — that is,
to effectively create sub-RPSs within the RPS. Conceptually, these tiers could focus
on individual resources. In practice, however, different tiers tend to include multiple
resources. The idea is to give differing value to specific classes of energy. For
instance, the United Kingdom’s RPS has included separate bands for (1) sewage and
biomass co-firing; (2) onshore wind, hydro, and other co-firing; (3) regular biomass;
(4) offshore wind and dedicated biomass; and (5) wave, solar, and geothermal.160
Thus, because solar might be included with other resources in an RPS tier, this is one
modification that can be made to these laws to support solar specifically, but the
support may be more diffuse than other methods.
A second way to modify RPSs to encourage solar use is a more precise species of
banding. This is known as the solar power “carve-out” or “set-aside.” For example,
an RPS might establish an overall compliance target of twenty percent renewables
generally but then also include a solar carve-out that five of those twenty percent be
met using PV.161 Obviously, this targets solar energy more precisely than general
RPS banding.
The third RPS method for targeting solar production is the credit multiplier. In this
version of an RPS, production of electricity from solar receives more credit toward
compliance than production from other eligible resources. To do so, this method
leverages renewable energy credits. For instance, an RPS with a solar credit multiplier
might afford one REC for every MWh of production from most renewables, but give
two RECs for every MWh of production from solar. The desired effect is to effectively
make solar more valuable than other renewables, thus encouraging solar use. The
concomitant risk, of course, is that by giving extra credit for solar, such multipliers
effectively reduce the overall target of the RPS.

160) Greg Buckman, The Effectiveness of Renewable Portfolio Standard Banding and Carve-outs
in Supporting High-Cost Types of Renewable Electricity, 39 Energy Pol’y 4105, 4108
(2011).
161) Theoretically, of course, such a design feature could be used for any resource, but in
practice, it is most popular for solar.
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Figure 4: U.S. RPSs with Solar-Specific Provisions162

Although early RPSs often did not include any of these mechanisms for promoting
solar, as these laws have become increasingly sophisticated, they also have begun to
focus more and more on solar as a way to diversify the portfolio of renewables they
promote. Indeed, in many jurisdictions, use of one or more of banding, carve-outs,
and credit multipliers within RPSs to promote solar is on the rise. In the United States,
for instance, as of 2006, only twelve states used banding, carve-outs, or credit
multipliers to promote solar or distributed generation (which effectively also
promotes solar).163 Today, twenty-two states plus Washington, D.C. have RPSs that
include solar power or distributed generation provisions, as shown in Figure 3.164

162) Data derived from Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency.
163) See Ryan H. Wiser, Meeting Expectations: A Review of State Experience with RPS Policies,
Lawrence Berkeley Nat’l Laboratory (Mar. 2006), https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/
presentation-awea-rps-3-06.pdf.
164) Database of State Incentives for Renewable Energy & Efficiency, Renewable Portfolio
Standards (RPS) with Solar or Distributed Generation Provisions (Aug. 2016), http://ncsolarcenprod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/RPS_carveout_3.pptx.
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D. The Rise of Tendering Regimes
Perhaps the most surprising development in solar support mechanisms of late is
the rise of tendering regimes. It is surprising because early tendering policies had
either loudly failed, been widely panned, or both. Indeed, the criticisms lodged
against such regimes were extensive: they were too costly, too ineffective, too
uncertain, too cumbersome, too prone to underbidding, and bad at encouraging
technological diversity.165 Now, however, many lawmakers believe they have found
design corrections to these flaws, and use of tenders is steadily on the rise.
A tendering regime is simply an auction mechanism used to meet a renewable
energy target. Because the idea is to procure a certain amount of renewable energy
production, and bids are made in response to that call for power, these laws are
sometimes called “reverse auctions” or “bidding” regimes. There are several types,
including sealed bid auctions, descending clock auctions, and hybrid auctions, but
the basic concept is the same. The government puts out a call for an amount of
renewable energy it wants to procure, either in terms of installed capacity or MWh
produced. Entities interested in winning the auction bid in. The lowest price is
chosen, and the winning entity receives a fixed price contract to provide that power.
Typically, the power is then sold again at a higher price, and the differential is
financed by a non-discriminatory electricity levy.166
Key advantages of tenders are that they have shown cost savings over FITs, that
they involve lower risk, and thus, that they theoretically have less need for
modification over time as well.167 The fact that prior tenders have not been effective
at promoting a diversity of resources, including solar, can be easily solved by
banding or tiering the auctions. Likewise, ineffectiveness can be addressed through
a variety of mechanisms, including penalties for non-compliance. As del Río and
Linares note, while auctions “present advantages and disadvantages compared to
FITs and TGCs . . . , many of these issues may be minimized by a careful design.”168
In part because of these design innovations, use of tenders continues to grow. In
2005, fewer than ten countries worldwide used tendering schemes to promote
renewable energy. As of 2013, that number had grown significantly, to nearly fifty

165) Pablo del Río & Pedro Linares, Back to the Future? Rethinking Auctions for Renewable
Electricity Support, 35 Renewable & Sustainable Energy Revs. 42, 48-50 (2014).
166) Benjamin K. Sovacool, A Comparative Analysis of Renewable Electricity Support Mechanisms
for Southeast Asia, 35 Energy 1779, 1789 (2010).
167) del Río & Linares, supra note 165, at 53-54.
168) Id. at 43.

KLRI Journal of Law and Legislation VOLUME 6 NUMBER 2, 2016

115

countries, including Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Hungary, Malta, Lithuania, Latvia,
Italy, and Portugal.169 Today, sixty-four countries have some kind of renewable
energy tendering regime in place.170 Importantly, moreover, some nations that
previously used feed-in tariffs to promote renewables have begun either
supplementing their FITs with tenders or replacing them altogether with auction
schemes.171

ɉ. MAPPING THE FUTURE OF SOLAR SUPPORT
Tracing the paths that solar support mechanisms have followed over the last four
decades is only part of the challenge of understanding these devices’ overall
function. It is just as important to map how these legal tools may continue to adapt,
evolve, and transform going forward. The tensions, trends, and lessons of these
tools’ past provide a key window into the future of solar support, both by offering
insight into the near-term direction of these laws and by highlighting pitfalls they
have already faced. Looking to the past of solar support to help map its legal future,
then, is critical.
This Part takes up that task. It first provides additional granularity and context to
the trends that solar support mechanisms are now undergoing via three case studies
of jurisdictions that have used different forms of these laws. In so doing, this Part
helps fill in some of the details and gaps that the basic conceptual map of solar
support mechanisms sketched out in Parts II and III alone cannot provide. Drawing
on these case studies, this Part then identifies several insights, trends, and tensions
inherent within the evolution of solar support laws to date. Because these insights
reveal that solar support policies are likely only to continue to change, managing that
evolution over time will be a core challenge for policymakers now and in the future.

A. Solar Support in Context
Given the ubiquity of jurisdictions using solar support mechanisms today,
possibilities for assessing the performance of these laws is broad. A core and
continuing focus of scholarship is to quantitatively evaluate the performance of these
mechanisms, often according to their efficacy, efficiency, equity, and dynamic
169) del Río & Mir-Artigues, supra note 85, at 289.
170) REN21 2016, supra note 53, at 19.
171) This is in part because the European Commission has identified tenders as a preferred
renewable energy support mechanism.
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efficiency. Undoubtedly, those inquiries will become only increasingly critical as
solar support laws continue to evolve. At the same time, there is significant value in
comparatively understanding the structural and qualitative functionality of these
laws.
This sub-Part takes the latter approach, seeking to shed light on the complexity of
solar support by underlining the gradual growth, and sharp twists and turns, these
laws have assumed. To do so, three jurisdictions are examined: Germany, Japan, and
Nevada. Each of these jurisdictions was chosen because, while their laws have
followed very different paths, they also share common characteristics. Specifically,
each jurisdiction has (1) rapidly (2) developed strong solar markets, (3) due in large
part to their solar support laws, which (4) in turn have undergone either substantial
change or complete transformation. Moreover, together, these three jurisdictions
spotlight the key changes in solar support laws over time, including the use of FITs,
NEM, and RPSs, along with subsequent changes to FIPs, NEB, and the use of solar
carve-outs and multipliers as well as tendering regimes.

1. Germany
Although widely recognized as the birthplace of the modern feed-in tariff, history
may ultimately prove Germany as the final resting place of this renewable energy
support mechanism as well. For, in the decade-and-a-half since Germany adopted
the EEG, the mother of all modern feed-in tariffs,172 that law has seen almost nothing
but tumult. Without question, the EEG has been effective at achieving its primary
objective of deploying renewables — remarkably so.173 But that accomplishment
has come at a very steep price. The renewables market in Germany repeatedly was
seen to overheat. Electricity prices skyrocketed.174 EEG costs also continually

172) See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
173) See, e.g., BMU, EEG, supra note 55, at 3, 13; Rainer Hinrichs-Rahlwes, Renewable Energy:
Paving the Way Towards Sustainable Energy Security Lessons Learnt from Germany, 49
Renewable Energy 10, 10ದ11 (2012), available at http://ac.els-cdn.com/S0960148112000870/
1-s2.0-S0960148112000870-main.pdf?_tid=04d1 aab0-9e82-11e3-9c73-00000aacb35f
&acdnat=1393376881_d3e5bf6e3d68cf2 b514370c1799458e2; Warren E. Mabee et al.,
Comparing the Feed-in Tariff Incentives for Renewable Electricity in Ontario and Germany,
40 Energy Pol’y 480, 482 (2012).
174) See, e.g., Frank Dohmen et al., Germany’s Energy Poverty: How Electricity Became a
Luxury Good, Spiegel Online Int’l (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/
high-costs-and-errors-of-german-transition-to-renewable-energy-a-920288.html;
Konstantin von Hammerstein & Peter Müller, Environment Minister Peter Altmaier: ‘We
Can’t Allow Electricity to Become a Luxury’, Spiegel Online Int’l (June 6, 2012),
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increased, arguably to the detriment of those who could least afford it.175
As a result, the German law has been modified again and again.176 At first, these
changes came in increments, slowly eroding the stability for which feed-in tariffs are
praised, but eventually they became much greater in both frequency and magnitude,
transforming the German FIT into something else entirely. As two prominent
observers have noted, the path of the German system is most accurately described
not as a durable FIT that has survived the test of time through small adjustments and
tweaks, maintaining its core structure while nimbly adapting to circumstances
changing around it, but rather, as a law that has utterly morphed into something new
— striking a clear path “from feed-in tariffs to direct marketing to competitive
bidding.”177
Tracing the arc of the German FIT regime is no easy task. Multiple trends are at
play, sometimes in opposition, and the way the scheme has treated small solar largely
stands out as an exception to other changes the law has undergone. At the same time,
the law’s transformation is heavily tied to the rapid rise of solar in Germany,178 this
resource’s plummeting cost,179 and the German populist ideal that small solar could

175)

176)

177)

178)
179)

http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-environment-minister-discusses-fr
esh-start-in-energy-revolution-a-837012.html.
Peter Müller & Alexander Neubacher, Spiegel Interview with Michael Fuchs: Solar
Subsidy ‘Insanity’ Will Cost Consumers, Spiegel Online Int’l (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.
spiegel.de/international/germany/spiegel-interview-with-michael-fuchs-solar-subsidy-in
sanity-will-cost-consumers-a-809529.html; Alexander Neubacher, Reality Check: Germany’s
Defective Green Energy Game Plan, Spiegel Online Int’l (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.
spiegel.de/international/germany/commentary-why-germany-is-waging-its-green-revol
ution-wrong-a-929693.html; Howard Rich, Germany’s Green Energy Disaster: A Cautionary
Tale for World Leaders, Forbes, Mar. 14, 2013.
Davies & Allen, supra note 64, at 943-59. For more on the EEG and the role of solar in
Germany, see, e.g., Jurgen Weiss, The Brattle Group, Solar Energy Support in Germany:
A Closer Look, (July 2014), http://www.seia.org/sites/default/files/resources/1053germany
-closer-look.pdf; Germany’s Electricity Market Out of Balance, Inst. for Energy Res. (Aug.
22, 2014), http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/analysis/germanys-electricity-marketbalance-must-pay-flexible-back-power/; Thomas Kaschub et al., Solar Energy Storage in
German Households: Profitability, Load Changes and Flexibility, 98 Energy Pol’y 520
(2016).
Matthias Lang & Annette Lang, The 2014 German Renewable Energy Sources Act Revision
– From Feed-in Tariffs to Direct Marketing to Competitive Bidding, 33 J. of Energy & Nat.
Resources L. 131, 136-38 (2015).
Davies & Allen, supra note 64, at 998.
Korean-German Chamber of Commerce and Indus., Market Study: Green Technology in
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help reinvent the nation’s electricity system. Thus, how the German EEG scheme
treats solar must first be understood in the broader context of the core structural
changes made to that law. Indeed, the 2014 version of the German EEG used solar
PV as a trial balloon for transforming the law away from a FIP to what it is today
effectively a tendering scheme.180
The EEG, as noted, started out somewhat humbly, building on the quite successful
StrEG by tying tariff prices to technology costs, mandating interconnection and
purchase, and guaranteeing payment for long periods of time, often twenty years.181
The original version of the EEG adopted in 2000 also was quite straightforward: The
StrEG consisted of only five sections and occupied “not even” two pages of law; the
EEG added only seven sections more and barely covered three-and-a-half pages of
law.182 Yet, while the EEG cemented the archetypal structure of a FIT, it simultaneously
included some provisions that broke rank from what many now view as the basic
feed-in tariff form. Most prominently, the original EEG built in degression schedules
for its tariff rates, meaning that the price paid to generators would still be predictable
but would also decline according to statutory schedule over time.183
Soon, the EEG would depart from the standard FIT structure even more. In a series
of changes implemented in 2004, 2010, 2011, and 2012, the German legislature
repeatedly modified the law in ways that added components typically ascribed to
other renewable energy support policies, made the law far more market-oriented,
and steadily injected uncertainty into the way — and the level at which — the EEG
would support renewables.184
Thus, in 2004, the EEG included a target of twenty percent renewable electricity
production by 2020.185 While laudable, the addition of this goal to a feed-in tariff was

180)

181)
182)
183)
184)
185)

Korea 10 (Sept. 2010; Toby D. Couture, FITs and Stops: Spain’s New Renewable Energy
Plot Twist & What it All Means, E3 Analytics, (Mar. 2012), at 6, available at http://www.
e3analytics.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Analytical_Brief_Vol4_Issue1.pdf.
Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz [EEG] [Renewable Energy Sources Act], August 1, 2014,
Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBl. I], §§ 56-62 (Ger.) [hereinafter EEG 2014]. The English
version is available at http://www.bmwi.de/English/Redaktion/Pdf/renewable-energysources-act-eeg-2014,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi2012,sprache=en,rwb=true.pdf.
See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
Matthias Lang & Annette Lang, Overview Renewable Energy Sources Act, German Energy
Blog, http://www.germanenergyblog.de/?page_id=283 (last visited Sept. 9, 2016).
See, e.g., EEG 2000, supra note 79, at 305, §§ 5(2), 8(5).
See Davies & Allen, supra note 64, at 943-59.
Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz [EEG] [Renewable Energy Sources Act], July 31, 2004,
Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl.] at 40, § 1 art. 1(2) (Ger.) [hereinafter EEG 2004]. The English
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notable for effectively combining what historically had been seen as a core component
of RPSs to a FIT scheme.186 Indeed, in ensuing years, the EEG’s renewables targets
only got larger and more aggressive, also a trend seen in the RPS portion of the
renewable energy support world.187 For instance, in part because Germany announced
it would abdicate use of nuclear energy following the disaster at Fukushima Daiichi
in Japan,188 the 2011 EEG ramped up its renewables targets to thirty-five percent by
2020, fifty percent by 2030, sixty-five percent by 2040, and eighty percent by
2050189 — goals it effectively affirmed in the 2014 legislation again amending the
EEG.190
Likewise, beginning in 2004, FIT rates became even more “banded” within
resources than they had been under the 2000 regime.191 That is, the 2004 EEG
established different tariff prices for different sizes and locations of resources. A 500
kW biomass installation might receive one price, for instance, a 5 MW installation
another price, and a 20 MW facility a different price still.192 Thus, just as RPSs were
becoming more fine-grained with different goals for different types of renewables,193
so too was the way the EEG approached compensation.
The EEG also began a steady march toward becoming more market-oriented. This
was reflected most noticeably in the continuing adjustment (both upward and

186)
187)
188)

189)

190)

191)
192)
193)

version of the statute is available at https://www.clearingstelle-eeg.de/files/node/8/EEG_
2004_Englische_Version.pdf.
Cf. Davies, supra note 57; del Río & Mir-Artigues, supra note 85.
See, e.g., Lincoln L. Davies, State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Is There a “Race” and
Is It “To the Top”?, 3 San Diego J. Climate & Energy L. 3 (2011).
For more on the Fukushima disaster, as well as its impact on energy law, see, for example,
Lincoln L. Davies, Beyond Fukushima: Disasters, Nuclear Energy, and Energy Law, 2011
BYU L. Rev. 1937 (2011); Lincoln L. Davies & Alexis S. Jones, Fukushima’s Shadow, 48
Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1083 (2015).
Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz [EEG] [Renewable Energy Sources Act], Apr. 1, 2012,
Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBl. I], § 1(2) (Ger.) [hereinafter EEG 2012]. The German
version of the statute is available at https://www.clearingstelle-eeg.de/files/node/8/EEG_
2012_Englische_Version.pdf.
The 2014 EEG put in place the following targets: 40 to 45 percent of electricity production
from renewables by 2025, 55 to 60 percent by 2035, and 80 percent by 2050. EEG 2014,
supra note 180, §1(2).
See Davies & Allen, supra note 64, at 952.
Compare EEG 2000, supra note 79, at 305, § 5(1), with, EEG 2004, supra note 185, at 40,
art. 8(1), § 1.
See supra Part III.C.
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downward, depending on the resource) in FIT rates adopted with each sequential
amendment of the law post-2000.194 Other modifications, however, also reoriented
the EEG toward the market. The idea of the atmender Deckel, first introduced in 2009
for solar but later extended in 2014 to onshore wind and biomass, made FIT rates
adjustable depending on the amount of capacity installed in a prior period.195 And,
most directly, the 2009 amendments to the EEG encouraged producers to sell their
power into the wholesale market rather than taking FIT payments,196 while the 2011
amendments induced this choice further by offering a “market premium” for doing
so.197
Eventually, all this came to a head. In 2014, Germany did not just amend the EEG,
but overhauled it. Quickly, this new iteration of the law became known as the EEG
2.0.198 It featured three key — and core — changes. First, the EEG 2.0 imposed an
obligation on almost all new resources that they sell their power into the market and
take the law’s “market premium” payment rather than the prior FIT rate.199 That is,
the EEG 2.0 transformed Germany’s FIT into a FIP.200 Second, the law imposed
so-called “growth corridors” for each resource.201 Very much like a tiered RPS,
194) See Davies & Allen, supra note 64, at 951-59.
195) Lang & Lang, supra note 182; see also Couture et al., supra note 63, at 41-42; David Jacobs,
Renewable Energy Policy Convergence in the EU: The Evolution of Feed-in Tariffs in
Germany, Spain and France 127 (2012).
196) Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz [EEG] [Renewable Energy Sources Act], Oct. 25, 2008,
Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBl. I], § 17 (Ger.) [hereinafter EEG 2009]. The German
version of the statute is available at https://www.clearingstelle-eeg.de/files/node/8/EEG_
2009_Englische_Version.pdf.
197) EEG 2012, supra note 189, §33(g); see also Mark Fulton et al., The German Feed-In Tariff:
Recent Policy Changes 5-6 (Sept. 2012), available at http://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_
INTERNET_EN-PROD/PROD0000000000294376/The+German+Feed-in+Tariff:+Rec
ent+Policy+Changes.pdf.
198) Kerstine Appunn, Comparing Old and New: Changes to Germany's Renewable Energy
Act, Clean Energy Wire (Oct. 7, 2014), https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/
comparing-old-and-new-changes-germanys-renewable-energy-act; Tam Hunt, Is Germany
Abandoning Its Commitment to the Energy Transition?, Greentech Media (Oct. 16, 2014),
http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/Is-Germany-Abandoning-its-Commitmen
t- to-the-Energy-Transition.
199) EEG 2014, supra note 180, §34; Bundesministerium fuɰr Wirtschaft & Energie, Photovoltaics,
Wind Power and Biomass: The Reforms at a Glance (Aug. 1, 2014), available at
http://www.bmwi.de/English/Redaktion/Pdf/eeg-faktenblatt-neuerungen-auf-einen-blic
k,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi2012,sprache=en,rwb=true.pdf.
200) Lang & Lang, supra note 177, at 136-138.
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these corridors established predetermined goals for how much generation capacity
could be installed per year by resource.202 This, of course, was quite different from
a traditional FIT, which presumes the appropriate amount of growth will occur
because the tariff level has been set at the proper price.203 Third, the EEG 2.0
announced that the government would conduct a pilot project in which larger PV
installations would be met through a tendering process rather than FITs or FIPs.204
The rationale for this was clear; it was to test the waters for planned future changes
to the law.
Only two years later, those changes came. In July 2016, the German legislature
again modified the EEG, this time transitioning the regime away from a FIP and into
a different species of law altogether. Specifically, the 2016 amendments, which take
effect beginning in January 2017, implement a tender system for the vast majority
of EEG resources.205 Thus, under this new law, which some are referring to as the
EEG 3.0,206 prices for these generators will be set by auction rather than legislatively
by a FIT.
Although their full effect remains to be seen, the scope of the 2014 and 2016
changes to the EEG cannot be overstated. The law that now exists as the EEG —
weighing in at over 100 sections, four annexes, and more than fifty pages207 — is not
only more complex than any prior version of the statute, it is different in kind. While
many observers suggested the changes were necessary to reign in the escalating cost
of the law and others noted that modifications were needed to address the limits of
European Union competition law,208 the fact is that the new statute has instituted a
substantively different legal structure for renewables support than in the past. It may
be, then, as German Chancellor Angela Merkel insisted, that the EEG 2.0 marked “an
important step for [Germany’s] future energy supply.”209 But that does not change
the simple truth that feed-in tariffs no longer rule in Germany. As Josef Fell, a former
201)
202)
203)
204)
205)

EEG 2014, supra note 180, §3.
Id.; see supra Part III.C.
See supra Part II.A.
EEG 2014, supra note 180, §55.
Kerstine Appunn, EEG Reform 2016 – Switching to Auctions for Renewables, Clean
Energy Wire (July 8, 2016), https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/eeg-reform2016-switching-auctions-renewables.
206) See id.
207) Lang & Lang, supra note 182.
208) Matthias Lang & Annette Lang, Revision German Renewable Energy Sources Act – BMWi
Starts Consultation on Draft EEG 2016, German Energy Blog (Apr. 18, 2016), http://www.
germanenergyblog.de/?p=19666.
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lawmaker who helped author the original EEG, put it, the 2014 amendments were
“the beginning of the end of the renewable energy act”210 — that is, both a “major
shift” and a “complete overhaul” of the prior law.211
Throughout all these adjustments and shifts, the German treatment of solar struck
a somewhat different path than the rest of the EEG. Although the EEG built on the
nation’s very successful “1,000 solar roofs” program,212 solar was the first resource
the EEG capped: at 350 MW, although that cap was lifted in 2004 when the law was
first substantively amended.213 For a long time, solar also received generous FIT
rates, starting at 50.62 €cents/kWh in 2000 and climbing to 57.4 €cents/kWh in 2004,
before falling to 43.01 €cents/kWh in 2009.214 Eventually, in 2012, EEG solar
support rates dropped to much lower levels, with those for facilities under 10 MW
coming in at 13.5 €cents/kWh215 — a change made directly in response to uncontrolled
solar growth that came as FIT rates stayed high but panel costs plummeted.216
Nonetheless, much else stayed the same for solar, or at least for distributed solar,
under the new EEG regimes. While the 2012 amendments imposed a new cap on
solar installations, that limit — 52 GW — far exceeded what most observers ever
could have expected when the 2000 law put in place its original 350 MW program
limit.217 Moreover, both the EEG 2.0 and EEG 3.0 exempted small solar PV facilities
(under 750 kW) from both the market premium and tendering mandates.218 Thus,

209) Peter Dinkloh, EEG 2.0 – A New Legal Framework for the German Energy Transition:
Germany Revamps Renewables Law As It Adapts to Future with Green Power, Clean
Energy Wire (Aug. 1, 2014), https://www.cleanenergywire.org/dossiers/eeg-20-new-legalframework-german-energy-transition-0.
210) Id.
211) Lang & Lang, supra note 177, at 136-138; Sören Amelang & Kerstine Appunn, First
Reactions to Renewable Energy Act Reform Proposal, Clean Energy Wire (Jan. 27, 2016),
https://www.cleanenergywire.org/news/first-reactions-renewable-energy-act-reform-pro
posal.
212) See Mischa Bechberger & Danyel Reiche, Renewable Energy Policy in Germany:
Pioneering and Exemplary Regulations, 8 Energy for Sustainable Dev. 47, 49-50 (2004);
Lauber & Mez, supra note 73, at 3.
213) EEG 2004, supra note 185, at 40.
214) Compare EEG 2000, supra note 79, at 305, § 8 and EEG 2004, supra note 185, at 40, § 1
art. 1(2), with EEG 2009, supra note 196, § 33(1).
215) EEG 2012, supra note 189, § 32(1) (Ger.).
216) Davies & Allen, supra note 64, at 958-59.
217) EEG 2012, supra note 189, § 20b(9a).
218) See Appunn, supra note 205; Lang & Lang, supra note 182.
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while larger solar facilities became subject to these requirements, and while that may
well change the way solar is built in Germany going forward, smaller, distributed
facilities still are eligible to receive guaranteed feed-in tariff rates.
Critically, both the EEG and its treatment of solar energy have helped transform
the energy landscape in Germany. In 1990 when the StrEG was adopted, only 3.4
percent of German electricity production came from renewables — and most of that
(nearly ninety-two percent) came from hydropower, with only a single GWh
produced from solar.219 By the time the original EEG was enacted, the overall share
of renewables had grown to 6.2 percent, and solar registered at 60 GWh.220 As of
2014, both renewables generally and solar specifically have eclipsed these figures.
Total electricity production in Germany from renewables marked 27.4 percent — an
astonishing change from barely a decade earlier.221 And solar accounted for a
breathtaking 35,115 GWh of production — nearly twenty-two percent of renewables
production.222
What impact the 2014 and 2016 reforms will have on these trends is a complex
and massively important question, one that all the world will be watching. But if
either the recent past or the aspirations of the EEG 3.0 are any indication, the sun may
continue to shine on solar power in Germany. Indeed, this is a nation that increased
its installed PV capacity from 2 MW in 1990, to 114 MW in 2000, to 1.1 GW in 2004,
to 38.2 GW in 2014,223 a remarkably steep curve that kept pushing upward even as
the EEG was repeatedly, and significantly, reformed.224

219) Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, Renewable Energy Sources in Figures:
National and International Development, 2014 10 (2014), available at https://www.bmwi.de/
English/Redaktion/Pdf/renewable-energy-sources-in-figures,property=pdf,bereich=bm
wi2012,sprache=en,rwb=true.pdf.
220) Id.
221) Id.
222) Id.
223) Id. at 12.
224) Following the 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 amendments, Germany’s installed solar capacity
continued to rapidly increase to about 10.6 GW, 17.9 GW, 25.4 GW, and 33 GW. In 2014,
this trend continued as solar installed capacity reached 38.2 GW, becoming 42.5 percent
of Germany’s renewable energy. See id.; see also Germany Sets New Record, Generating
74 Percent of Power Needs From Renewable Energy, ThinkProgress (May 13, 2014),
https://thinkprogress.org/germany-sets-new-record-generating-74-percent-of-power-nee
ds-from-renewable-energy-6ca91febc44e#.tfcpfwvkq (noting that one day in May of
2014, renewable energy generated nearly 75 percent of the electricity demand, largely in
part to solar and wind.); Matthias Lang & Annette Lang, 97.677 MWp: PV Growth Remains
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2. Japan
The story of Japan’s support for solar is noteworthy for the contrast it strikes with
Germany’s. While Germany long has sought to bolster a wide array of renewables,
for decades Japan has focused almost exclusively on solar. While Germany has
captured extensive media attention for its Energiewende effort to transform its
economy with renewables, Japan has quietly, largely matched Germany’s performance:
Germany ranks third in the world in total installed capacity of non-renewables,
excluding hydro; Japan is fourth.225 Germany is second globally in installed solar
PV; Japan is third.226 Germany did not place in the top five countries worldwide for
new installed PV in 2015; Japan was second.227 And, while the arc of Germany’s
support for solar is quite clear — a transition from FIT to FIP to tendering, with
constant support for small-scale solar using a FIT whose rate has consistently
declined since 2009 — Japan’s policies have been much less consistent, repeatedly
starting, stopping, and flipping from one mechanism to another over time.
Indeed, the path of Japan’s renewable energy policy hardly marks a straight
line.228 Like many nations, Japan began promoting renewables in the 1970s in
response to the global oil crises. Of course, for Japan, an island nation with little
domestic fossil resources, the oil crises were felt even more keenly than in other parts
of the globe. Japan thus began promoting renewables largely from the perspective
of research and development, with the hope to foster a strong industry that could
forge a new path toward homegrown energy security.
The first of these efforts began in 1974 and was dubbed the Sunshine Project.229
Funded by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, the Sunshine Project
established a goal of supplying 1.6 percent of the nation’s primary energy demand

225)
226)
227)
228)

229)

on the Level of the Previous Months, German Energy Blog (June 2, 2015), http://www.
germanenergyblog.de/?p=18731 (noting that most months remained steady with solar
installations, yet two months exceeded the par, with more installations in April 2015 than
2010 to 2013).
REN21 2016, supra note 53, at 21.
Id.
Id. at 21, 63.
See S. Avril et al., Photovoltaic Energy Policy: Financial Estimation and Performance
Comparison of the Public Support in Five Representative Countries, 51 Energy Pol’y 244,
250-51 (2012).
Véronique Vasseur et al., , A Comparative Analysis of Photovoltaic Technological Innovation
Systems Including International Dimensions: The Cases of Japan and The Netherlands, 48
J. of Cleaner Production 200, 200 (2013).

KLRI Journal of Law and Legislation VOLUME 6 NUMBER 2, 2016

125

from renewables by 1990.230 When the second oil crisis hit in 1979, the Japanese
government doubled down on this effort. It increased the Sunshine Project’s budget
by 200 percent and raised the renewable energy target to five percent by 1990 and
seven percent by 1995.231 It also added to the mix the Moonshine Project, which
included support specifically for photovoltaics.232 These efforts had some effect.
Electricity production from renewables grew, but barely noticeably.233 Accordingly,
by the early 1990s, it was time for a reboot of this program.
Japan initiated the reboot in three ways. First, in 1992, the government created the
so-called New Sunshine Project, which combined the prior Sunshine Project and the
Moonshine Project in furtherance of fostering 930 MW of new PV installations by
2005. Second, also in 1992, ten utilities voluntarily began offering a net metering
program for solar PV, with a rate of compensation of roughly 23 ¥/kWh.234 Third,
in 1994, the government began offering a national subsidy, known as the Seventy
Thousand Roofs Program, of up to fifty percent reimbursement of total costs for
residential solar PV.235 Together, these programs were “so successful that authorities
were able to reduce the solar PV installation subsidy from 900 ¥/watt in 1994 to 20
¥/watt in 2005.”236
By the end of the century, however, Japan decided to take a hard turn away from
PV subsidies and toward a different renewable energy support regime. In 2003, the
nation adopted a Renewable Portfolio Standard, applicable to utilities and aimed at
promoting renewable electricity production more widely. Specifically, that law
targeted six renewable energy sources: solar, wind, geothermal, hydro, biomass, and

230) Sanjeeda Chowdhury et al., Importance of Policy for Energy System Transformation:
Diffusion of PV technology in Japan and Germany, 68 Energy Pol’y 285, 288 (2014);
Firdaus Muhammad-Sukki et al., Feed-in Tariff for Solar Photovoltaic: The Rise of Japan,
68 Renewable Energy 636, 637 (2014).
231) Chowdhury et al., supra note 230, at 288; Muhammad-Sukki et al., supra note 230, at 637.
232) Paul Parker, Residential Solar Photovoltaic Market Stimulation: Japanese and Australian
Lessons for Canada, 12 Renewable & Sustainable Energy Revs. 1944, 1947 (2008).
233) Japan Energy Dashboard, Global Energy Network Inst. (last updated June 30, 2016),
http://www.geni.org/globalenergy/library/energy-issues/japan/index.shtml.
234) Chowdhury et al., supra note 230, at 290; Muhammad-Sukki et al., supra note 230, at 637.
235) Travis Bradford, Solar Revolution: The Economic Transformation of the Global Energy
Industry 178 (2006); Muhammad-Sukki et al., supra note 230, at 637. This program was
also known as the Monitoring Programme for Residential PV Systems, which ran from
1994 to 1996, and later, the Programme for the Development of the Infrastructure for the
Introduction of Residential PV Systems. Parker, supra note 232, at 1948.
236) Chowdhury et al., supra note 230, at 290.
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waste.237 It also carried remarkably low ambitions. It aimed to ensure the production
of 12.2 TWh of renewable electricity by 2010, or roughly 1.35 percent of
economy-wide power sales.238 Japanese utilities easily met this goal, but in so doing
hardly transformed the nation’s electricity system. Utilities primarily used
waste-fired generation for RPS purposes, while wind barely made a dent and solar
likewise was not relevant.239 As one set of observers noted, the Japanese RPS “has
proven ineffective because the target is quite low” and “the policy allows utility
companies to carry over a surplus of renewable generation from the previous year,
which discourages building new renewable facilities.”240
Continuing this trajectory toward renewables other than solar, the Japanese
government let the subsidy for residential PV lapse in 2005.241 As a result, the solar
market quickly stagnated,242 even though 250,000 PV installations had been made
under the New Sunshine program, meeting its 930 MW installed capacity objective.243
Soon, though, the government would shift its attention again and refocus on solar.
In November 2009, Japan instituted a limited feed-in tariff program, under which
utilities were obliged to buy only surplus power from residential PV installations.244
While restrained in scope, this new FIT offered generous compensation: 48 ¥/kWh,
compared to the previously available 23 ¥/kWh.245 Almost immediately, installations
ticked up, with PV additions in 2009 doubling the 2008 figures.246
Three years later, solar installations were still going strong, when they suddenly
became even more important. In the aftermath of the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi
237) Parker, supra note 232, at 1948.
238) Yoko Ito, Inst. of Energy Econ., A Brief History of Measures to Support Renewable
Energy: Implications for Japan's FIT Review Obtained from Domestic and Foreign Cases
of Support Measures 3 (Oct. 2015).
239) Kae Takase & Tatsujiro Suzuki, The Japanese Energy Sector: Current Situation, and
Future Paths, 39 Energy Pol’y 6731, 6736 (2011).
240) Wei-Ming Chen et al., Renewable Energy in Eastern Asia: Renewable Energy Policy
Review and Comparative SWOT Analysis for Promoting Renewable Energy in Japan,
South Korea, and Taiwan, 74 Energy Pol’y 319, 324 (2014).
241) Espen Moe, Vested Interests, Energy EfƤciency and Renewables in Japan, 40 Energy Pol’y
260, 264 (2012).
242) See Avril et al., supra note 228, at 251; Chowdhury et al., supra note 230, at 289.
243) Muhammad-Sukki et al., supra note 230, at 637.
244) Kae Takase, NAPSNet Special Reports: Renewable Energy Burst in Japan 4 (May 27,
2014), http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/energy_burst_japan/.
245) Id.
246) Id.; Avril et al., supra note 228, at 251.
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disaster, the Japanese government chose to expand the FIT, in part to use renewables
to help make up for lost nuclear generation capacity. Thus, rather than singling out
residential PV as the prior law had, the newly expanded FIT swept in all renewables
and established different tariff rates for each resource, while simultaneously keeping
in place the high level of remuneration for small PV installations.247 Moreover,
Japan also put in place aggressive installation targets for both solar specifically and
renewables generally: 28 GW of PV by 2020 and 50 GW by 2030, and between
twenty and thirty-five percent of all electricity production from renewables by
2030.248
Implementation of Japan’s new FIT scheme has not been without problems. The
customer surcharge imposed to pay for new installations increased from ¥130 billion
in 2012 to ¥1.3 trillion in 2015.249 Although the new FIT targets multiple resources,
solar has continued to dominate, in part because of the extensive environmental
review process that wind projects must undergo and in part because utilities in Japan
see small PV as less threatening to their incumbent position than larger renewable
installations.250 Regional differences in the Japanese electricity grid also have stifled
some projects,251 and significant new transmission capacity is needed if the FIT is
truly going to transform the Japanese electricity system.252 Moreover, the FIT
regime has approved more projects than have actually been built, allowing these
future facilities to lock in high tariff rates,253 highlighting the need to reform the law
to ensure that proposals come to fruition.254
Despite these difficulties, Japan’s feed-in tariff regime — like that in Germany —
already has significantly changed how energy is produced in this nation, including
from solar. Indeed, in 2013, the year after it adopted its current FIT, Japan added 6.9
247)
248)
249)
250)

251)
252)

253)
254)

Ito, supra note 238, at 7; Takase, supra note 244, at 4.
Avril et al., supra note 228, at 251; Muhammad-Sukki et al., supra note 230, at 638.
See Ito, supra note 238, at 7.
See Amory B. Lovins, How Opposite Energy Policies Turned the Fukushima Disaster Into
a Loss for Japan and a Win For Germany, Forbes, June 28, 2014, http://onforb.es/
1m8BQ3u; Moe, supra note 241, at 266, 269; Takase, supra note 244, at 4.
Takase, supra note 244, at 4.
See Takeshi Kuramochi, Review of Energy and Climate Policy Developments in Japan
Before and After Fukushima, 43 Renewable & Sustainable Energy Revs. 1320, 1328
(2015); Takase, supra note 244, at 10-11.
Kuramochi, supra note 253, at 1328.
See Kenji Kaneko, Japan Enacts Bill to Review Feed-in Tariff Policy for Renewable
Energy, Japan Today, May 30, 2016, https://www.japantoday.com/category/business/
view/japan-enacts-bill-to-review-feed-in-tariff-policy-for-renewable-energy.
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GW of solar.255 The next year, in 2014, it built 9.7 GW more of PV.256 And in 2015,
it added another 11 GW.257 Together, these installations bring the nation’s
cumulative installed PV up from just over 5 GW in 2011 to more than 35 GW today
— a remarkable transformation, and a clear indication that, in the land of the rising
sun, PV continues to climb.258

3. Nevada
Nevada, like Germany and Japan, until recently seemed very much to be a
jurisdiction on the rise for solar power. In 1997, the state adopted a renewable
portfolio standard imposing a rather modest one percent overall renewable generation
target by 2009.259 Four years later, the legislature increased that target to thirteen
percent by 2013.260 And in 2009, it raised the stakes even more, imposing a
twenty-five percent renewables by 2025 mandate on utilities in the state.261 Nevada,
moreover, did not seek just to promote renewables generally. It targeted solar as well.
Beginning in 2003, Nevada’s RPS included both a solar carve-out and a solar-specific
credit multiplier. Specifically, the 2003 legislation established a requirement that
five percent of the RPS be met by solar262 — and it applied a 2.4 credit multiplier to
solar installations “on the premises of a retail customer” where at least fifty percent
of the power is consumed on-site.263
At the same time, Nevada developed a robust net metering scheme. Instituted in
1997 and amended several times in subsequent years,264 Nevada’s NEM program

255) Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century, Renewables 2014 Global Status
Report 47 (2014), http://www.ren21.net/Portals/0/documents/Resources/GSR/2014/GSR
2014_full%20report_low%20res.pdf.
256) Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century, Renewables 2015 Global Status
Report 58 (2015), http://www.ren21.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/REN12-GSR2015_
Onlinebook_low1.pdf.
257) REN21 2016, supra note 53, at 60.
258) See id.; Status of Renewable Energies in Japan, Inst. for Sustainable Energy Policies (July
29, 2015), http://www.isep.or.jp/en/library/2982.
259) Act of July 16, 1997, ch. 482, 1997 Stat. of Nev., § 52, AB 366.
260) Act of June 2, 2003, ch. 332, 2003 Stat. of Nev., § 11, AB 429.
261) Nev. Rev. Stat. § 704.7821.
262) Id. § 704.7821(2)(a).
263) Id. § 704.7822.
264) Net Metering: Program Info (Nevada), Energy.gov, http://energy.gov/savings/net-metering-22
(last visited Sept. 8, 2016).
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initially was limited in scope. It applied only to facilities of 10 kW or smaller, and
then only to the first 100 customer-generators in each utility’s service territory.265
Beginning in 2001, however, the legislature removed the 100-customer limitation,266
and in 2005, it increased the size of eligible facilities to 150 kW267 — and in 2011,
again to 1 MW.268 From the outset, this program plainly targeted solar as a resource.
As the original law — which applied only to micro-solar and-wind — stated,269 net
metering was instituted to “[e]ncourage private investment in renewable energy” and
to “[e]nhance the continued diversification of the energy resources used in this state.”270
Nevada’s legal efforts to promote solar worked. The state’s solar-friendly RPS,
combined with its net metering program and its naturally sunny location in the U.S.
Southwest, made Nevada a very attractive location for solar growth. Solar
companies quickly flocked to the state, and the number and size of installations
rapidly climbed. By 2015, Nevada ranked third in the United States for new solar,
adding 409 MW of capacity, which moved the state up to fifth overall in the nation
in terms of aggregate installed capacity, with 1,300 MW.271 These installations
represented $833 million in investments, and were made by over 100 companies
operating in the state with 8,764 employees.272 Moreover, projections showed that
Nevada’s use of solar would only continue expanding, with an expected 2,408 MW
of additional installations to come online by 2020.273 All this led the Solar Energy
Industries Association to rank Nevada fifth nationally on its list of “top” solar
states.274
Despite the optimism over Nevada solar, clouds soon appeared on the horizon. In
2013, the state legislature took two key actions that quickly started a broader process
for limiting legal support for distributed solar. First, the legislature amended the
Nevada RPS to end the 2.4 solar credit multiplier for facilities built after 2015.275

265) Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 704.771, 704.773 (1998).
266) Nev. Rev. Stat. § 704.773 (2002).
267) Nev. Rev. Stat. § 704.771 (2006). That same year, the legislature imposed a one percent of
utility load cap on the program. Id. § 773.
268) Nev. Rev. Stat. § 771(1)(a)(2).
269) Nev. Rev. Stat. § 704.771 (1998).
270) Id. § 704.766 (1998).
271) State Solar Policy: Nevada Solar, Solar Energy Industries Ass’n, http://www.seia.org/state
-solar-policy/Nevada (last visited Sept. 7, 2016).
272) Id.
273) Id.
274) Id.

130

Making Sense of the Rapidly Evolving Legal Landscape of Solar Energy Support Regimes
Lincoln L. Davies

Second, the legislature directed the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) to conduct
a comprehensive examination of the costs and benefits of net metering in the state.276
The resulting study, which holistically assessed the role of solar in Nevada, including
its electricity system impacts and its health benefits, found that net metering systems
built in Nevada from 2004 through 2016 provided a net benefit of roughly $36
million to non-NEM customers.277 However, the study also found that net metering
drove electricity prices up by about $0.02/kWh.278 And, because Nevada’s RPS gave
such generous treatment to distributed solar and the price of utility-scale facilities was
rapidly dropping, the study concluded that net metering actually slightly increased
air pollution.279
Although this study was generally well received, it did not take long for the
legislature to seize on it as an opportunity to further revise net metering rules in
Nevada. In June 2015, less than a year after the study was issued, Nevada’s governor
signed into law legislation that significantly changed the net metering statute in three
key ways. First, it reduced the program cap to 235 MW.280 Second, it forbade the
PUC from approving NEM tariffs that “unreasonably shift costs” from NEM customers
to non-NEM customers.281 Third, it bestowed new authority on the PUC to create
“one or more rate classes” specifically for NEM customers.282 Almost immediately,
these changes had a drastic impact on net metering in Nevada.
Less than two months later, on July 31, 2015, the key utility in the state, NV Energy,
made a filing with the Nevada PUC seeking to overhaul its net metering program.
This proposal built directly off the recently adopted legislation. It sought to create
a separate customer class for NEM users. It requested imposition of a large,
NEM-customer-specific fixed service charge, as well as a demand charge for those
ratepayers. And it proposed reducing the amount of money credited to NEM customers
for producing power.283

275) Act of June 3, 2013, ch. 423, 2013 Stat. of Nev., § 9, SB 252.
276) Act of June 11, 2013, ch. 510, 2013 Stat. of Nev., §§ 5-7, AB 428.
277) Snuller Price et al., Nevada Net Energy Metering Impacts Evaluation 5-13 (Energy & Envtl.
Econ., Inc., 2014).
278) Id.
279) Id.
280) Act of June 5, 2015, ch. 379, 2015 Stat. of Nev., § 2.95, SB 374.
281) Id. §2.3.
282) Id.
283) Sierra Pacific Power Company D/B/A NV Energy’s Application for Approval of a Cost of
Service Study and Net Metering Tariffs, Original Filing, Public Utilities Comm’n of
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The PUC quickly acted on NV Energy’s rate filing. On December 23, 2015, after
a heated administrative proceeding, the PUC gave NV Energy virtually everything
it had asked for, with a few specific changes. The stage was set by the agency’s
threshold determination. It found that a separate class of NEM customers must be
created because the existing net metering program was subsidizing NEM customers
on the order of $9 to $114 per month from non-NEM customers. In reaching this
conclusion, the PUC rejected arguments that it should rely on the prior, holistic study
of NEM benefits in Nevada. Instead, it found that NV Energy’s study, which was
limited to electricity system costs and benefits, must be used. That study, the PUC
found, showed that NEM customers were not paying their fair share for use of the
grid. That is, the Commission effectively ruled that the grid was acting as a safety
net for NEM customers, but the customers were not paying for the full cost of their
use of that net, both because they used less electricity from the grid and because they
were compensated for what they sent back to it.284
Consequently, the PUC decided that a new and different net metering scheme
would be instituted in the state. This program, which many quickly dubbed “NEM
2.0” for its net billing aspect, would be rolled out in five stages over twelve years.
Specifically, while rejecting the demand charge proposed by NV Energy, the
Commission ruled that the new regime would (1) impose a high fixed service charge
on NEM customers and (2) no longer compensate NEM customers at the full retail
rate, but rather, credit them only for the avoided cost of energy they produced.285 The
net effect was to slash how much NEM customers could save from installing solar
on their homes. In NV Energy’s southern service territory, for instance, NEM
customers previously paid roughly $0.11/kWh for electricity, plus a $12.75/month
basic service charge. If, however, they produced more power than they needed at any
given time, they also would be credited $0.11/kWh for any such electricity they sent
back to the grid. Nevada’s new NEM 2.0 scheme changed all this. Once it takes full
effect in 2028, these same customers will pay a slightly reduced $0.10/kWh for
electricity, but that will come with an additional $38.51/month basic service charge

Nevada (July 31, 2015), available at http://pucweb1.state.nv.us/PDF/AxImages/DOCKETS
_2015_THRU_PRESENT/2015-7/4402.pdf.
284) Nevada Power Company D/B/A NV Energy’s Application for Approval of a Cost of
Service Study and Net Metering Tariffs & Sierra Pacific Power Company D/B/A NV
Energy’s Application for Approval of a Cost of Service Study and Net Metering Tariffs,
Modified Final Order, Public Utilities Comm’n of Nevada (Feb. 12, 2016), available at
http://pucweb1.state.nv.us/PDF/AxImages/DOCKETS_2015_THRU_PRESENT/20157/9688.pdf.
285) Id. at 181-83.
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— more than three times the prior amount. Yet, when they produce electricity they

send to the grid, they will be credited only about $0.02/kWh in compensation.286
Announcement of the PUC’s decision to transform Nevada’s NEM program into
an NEB regime elicited immediate reaction. Media outlets panned the decision,287
and the renewable energy community launched extensive and sharp criticisms.288
Indeed, the decision was so high profile that it attracted public demonstrations led
by celebrity activists, including the Hollywood actor, Mark Ruffalo, who declared
that protestors should “make life uncomfortable” for the PUC, which was wrongly
changing net metering by “tak[ing] from the mouths of the people and giv[ing] it to
a single monopoly utility.”289
Even more critically, the solar industry quickly reacted to the instigation of net
billing in Nevada. SolarCity, Sunrun, and Vivint Solar all announced they would halt
operations in the state, with SolarCity expressly stating it would relocate more than
550 jobs from Nevada to more “business-friendly” jurisdictions.290 The companies,
moreover, drew a direct line between the PUC’s decision and their actions. “No one,”
SolarCity’s CEO, Lyndon Rive, said, “would go solar in their right mind, if they
knew net metering was going to go away.”291
Either Rive was right, or the solar companies’ withdrawal from Nevada preordained
the result — or both. In the first quarter of 2016, which immediately followed the
PUC’s decision, new solar installations dropped ninety-two percent Nevada.292 As

286) Public Utilities Commission State of Nevada, Net Metering Rates & Rules, at 3 (Mar.
2016), available at www.puc.nv.gov.
287) See, e.g., Jacques Leslie, Nevada’s Solar Bait-and-Switch, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 2016, at A21,
available at http://nyti.ms/1nyRO9I.
288) See, e.g., Jeff St. John, Nevada’s Solar Job Exodus Continues, Driven by Retroactive Net
Metering Cuts, Greentech Media (Jan. 8, 2016), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/
read/nevadas-solar-exodus-continues-driven-by-retroactive-net-metering-cuts.
289) Katie Fehrenbacher, The Other Side of the Solar Firestorm in Nevada, Fortune, Apr. 12,
2016, http://fortune.com/2016/04/12/solar-firestorm-nevada/?iid=sr-link1.
290) See SolarCity, Press Release, Following Nevada PUC’s Decision to Punish Rooftop Solar
Customers, SolarCity Forced to Eliminate More than 550 Jobs in Nevada (Jan. 6, 2016),
http://www.solarcity.com/newsroom/press/following-nevada-pucs-decision-punish-roof
top-solar-customers-solarcity-forced.
291) Adam Burke, In Sunny Nevada, a Defeat for the Solar Industry, Marketplace (Feb. 23,
2016), http://www.marketplace.org/2016/02/23/world/nevada-solar.
292) Mark Muro & Devashree Saha, Brookings Inst., Rooftop Solar: Net Metering Is a Net
Benefit (May 23, 2016), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2016/05/23ದrooftop
-solar-net-metering-muro-saha#.V0MctMHjazs.email.
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the president of one Nevada solar company put it, “The PUC made a decision and
it just devastated our industry.”293

B. Insights, Trends, and Tensions
The legal histories in Germany, Japan, and Nevada highlight a number of key
insights into the intertwined relationship of change in the solar industry and
evolution in the legal mechanisms used to support that industry. The purpose of this
sub-Part is to explore these insights, and to draw on them to help explain what
broader trends may be at play: that is, where the future of solar support laws may be
headed. Specifically, this sub-Part makes three core observations about the recent
evolution of solar support regimes. First, change to these regimes is rapid, and is
arguably only increasing. Second, the way in which these changes are playing out
show both policy convergence and consolidation — convergence because the laws
are becoming increasingly market-oriented and consolidation because different
mechanisms are being combined with each other to the point that it is beginning to
be difficult to tell them apart. Third, it is quite likely that this rapid evolution to solar
support laws will continue, precisely because these laws embody fundamental
tensions in whether the electricity system can change and how price impacts play out
in the public sphere. Accordingly, managing this change will be a key challenge for
lawmakers worldwide going forward.

1. Legal Change, Rapidly
The first insight offered by the experiences of Germany, Japan, and Nevada is
somewhat obvious but nonetheless important. Put simply, the nature of legal support
mechanisms for solar energy is one of rapid change. This is demonstrated generally
by the over-arching trends of NEM regimes shifting to net billing, FITs becoming
FIPs, and the surprising rise of tendering, but it is made even more vivid by the
specific experiences of the three highlighted jurisdictions.
Indeed, Germany is arguably the lead exhibit worldwide for the rapidity with
which renewable energy support mechanisms may change, with significant modifications
to its law in 1990, 2000, 2004, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014, and 2016.294 Still,
Germany hardly stands alone in this regard, as other jurisdictions also have heavily

293) Jeff Brady, Nevada Solar Power Business Struggles to Keep the Lights on, NPR (Mar. 11,
2016, 4:29 PM), http://www.npr.org/2016/03/11/470097580/nevada-solar-power-businessstruggles-to-keep-the-lights-on.
294) See supra Part IV.A.1.
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and repeatedly modified their solar support regimes, such as Spain’s gutting of its
law and South Korea’s abandonment of it in favor of an RPS.295 Japan and Nevada
also fit neatly into this mold, perhaps not modifying their laws quite as often as
Germany but nonetheless clearly not sitting still, either in the number of times they
have modified their laws or in terms of the ways the shape of those laws have
shifted.296
Moreover, each of the jurisdictions highlighted here illustrates a different way this
rapid change may play out. In Germany, the evolution was one of building momentum.
A FIT came onto the scene, became more widely adopted, was tinkered with, then
significantly altered, and finally was replaced first with a FIP and then a tendering
mechanism — all the while as a FIT for small-scale solar stayed largely in place. By
contrast, Japan’s experience was more one of hard turns. Solar support programs
came and went, first through tax incentives but also using net metering, and then an
RPS came into play, only to be followed by a solar-specific and then a much broader
FIT. And in Nevada, the trajectory was growing support for solar, with a later stop
short — or fast switch — in focus, depending on one’s perspective. That jurisdiction
increasingly favored solar, both through an RPS and an NEM regime, both of which
grew only stronger for solar until 2015, when Nevada cut part of its solar-specific
RPS and entirely replaced its NEM program with NEB.
Thus, in a very direct way, the histories of solar support in Germany, Japan, and
Nevada highlight the close relationship between these laws and the solar energy
market. As the solar industry has continued to evolve, so too have the laws used to
support that industry. This hardly should be surprising, as the core purpose of these
statutes is to scale up solar installations, in turn driving down price through greater
economies of production, eventually to the point where solar can compete on its own
against other generation resources.297 As those costs come down, it should be
expected that the policy mechanisms used to support the industry will also begin to
evolve — and, indeed, they have.
A key problem, of course, is that determining in advance how those changes will
be made is at best a perilous task. The same observation can be made of all three of

295) See Davies & Allen, supra note 64, at 977, 995; see also Tae-hyeong Kwon, Rent and
Rent-seeking in Renewable Energy Support Policies: Feed-in Tariff vs. Renewable
Portfolio Standard, 44 Renewable & Sustainable Energy Revs. 676, 679 (2015).
296) See supra Part IV.A.2 and 3.
297) Davies, supra note 54, at 45-46, 52; see also, e.g., David Zilberman et al., On the Inclusion
of Indirect Land Use in Biofuel Regulations, 2011 U. Ill. L. Rev. 413, 431; cf. Gershon Feder
& Andrew Schmitz, Learning by Doing and Infant Industry Protection: A Partial Equilibrium
Approach, 43 Rev. of Econ. Stud. 175, 175 (1976).
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the policy trajectories of Germany, Japan, and Nevada: Predicting any of these legal
courses ex ante would have been effectively impossible; doing so going forward
from here would be just as difficult. Accordingly, because the precise contours of
how these regimes may change cannot be known in advance, it is critical to assess
the larger trajectories they may now be on.

2. Policy Convergence, Policy Consolidation
To be sure, one of the most critical observations about the recent trajectories of
solar support mechanisms is that they have begun to both converge and consolidate.
The two trends are related but different. They also appear only to be gaining pace,
which may provide insight into the likely near-term future of these laws.
Perhaps the most important way that solar support policies have begun to
converge is that these laws have become increasingly market-oriented — that is,
they have begun to tie the way they support solar to electricity markets overall. This
is true across mechanisms, and in many jurisdictions. There are key policy design
differences between Germany moving from a feed-in tariff to a tendering regime, for
instance, and Nevada shifting from NEM to NEB, but both pivots share a common
theme.298 Both seek to make these laws more responsive to the market. That such
moves have begun to occur is perhaps predictable, or even expected, particularly
given that a key aim of solar support laws is to move the technology across the
innovation valley of death and into the mainstream.299 In one sense, then, becoming
more market-oriented is merely the natural course of these laws. Still, it is
illuminating. For jurisdictions that have not yet faced this transformation, such as
Japan, the stories of Germany and Nevada are warnings that it soon may be coming.
At the same time that solar support mechanisms are broadly converging, they are
also becoming more consolidated.300 In this connection, consolidation means

298) See supra Parts IV.A.1 and .3. It is also worth noting, however, that not all the recent
changes to solar mechanisms are market-oriented. Solar-specific RPS carve-outs, for
instance, are regulatory rather than market-oriented in nature. They are effectively a
mandate on top of another mandate.
299) Bürer & Wüstenhagen, supra note 146, at 4998; see also Michael Grubb, Technology
Innovation and Climate Change Policy: An Overview of Issues and Options, 41 KEIO
Econ. Stud. 103 (2005).
300) On renewable energy policy convergence more generally, see, e.g., Eric Cardella et al.,
Price Volatility and Residential Electricity Decisions: Experimental Evidence on the
Convergence of Energy Generating Source, Energy Econ., at 9-10 (July 22, 2016),
available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2016.07.012; Michael Jakob et al., Will
History Repeat Itself? Economic Convergence and Convergence in Energy Use Patterns,
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different parts of various mechanisms are now being used across categories in other
kinds of laws. That is, the term “amalgamation” might also capture the trend. Or, as
Toby Couture and his co-authors have put it, the “rapid change” of these laws is
“breaking down conventional categories.”301
This trend can be seen in multiple manifestations. For instance, it is now quite
common to have in place a renewable energy target but also some other kind of
renewable or solar energy legal support regime. This, then, effectively means that
jurisdictions have begun to mix, for instance, a core component of an RPS with a
different support policy.302 In fact, of the forty-four countries listed as “upper-middle
income” by the Renewable Energy Policy Network, forty-three have some kind of
renewable energy target in place — but twenty-two use a FIT or a FIP, fourteen use
NEM or NEB, and only eight use an RPS.303 Some of these nations, moreover, use
different combinations of these three mechanisms.304 The same trend can be observed,
of course, in Germany, Japan, and Nevada. Germany long has had a mandatory target
that combined with its FIT, then its FIP, and now its tendering regime. Following the
amendments to its law this year, Germany will also use a tendering scheme for some
solar projects, but a FIT for others.305 Japan has used an RPS and a FIT simultaneously.306
And Nevada’s NEM, and now NEB, programs have operated in conjunction with
that state’s RPS, which also includes solar-specific targets.307
By itself, consolidation of support mechanisms is hardly problematic. All law,
eventually, is amended. In the solar context, in fact, it can be argued that the
combination of many of these legal mechanisms actually has been employed to
promote the industry, such as in Germany, Japan, and Nevada. But both this trend
and that of convergence highlight the need to carefully manage these laws, and
perhaps to better plan out their evolution in advance rather than just repeatedly
reacting to the market. There is a difference in kind between small, correcting
amendments that gradually seek to refine a law over time and big shifts that utterly
transform how a law operates. The former is expected; the latter is far more disruptive.
Indeed, a core need of renewable energy support laws is to provide a stable signal

301)
302)
303)
304)
305)
306)
307)

34 Energy Econ. 95, 96-97 (2012).
Couture et al., supra note 13, at 1.
See Davies, supra note 57, at 322-32, 346.
REN21 2016, supra note 53, at 120.
Id.
See supra Part IV.A.1.
See supra Part IV.A.2.
See supra Part IV.A.3.
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to the market.308 Yet if laws are rapidly changing, including by becoming more
market-oriented and by merging different ways of supporting solar and other
renewables, this risks undermining the very stability these laws are supposed to
provide.309 Accordingly, when that occurs, managing the change, if not limiting it,
takes on great importance.310 This is particularly true given that what lies on the
horizon is likely to be only more of the same.

3. Inevitable Tensions, Enduring Change
While understanding the overall trajectory of solar support laws is critical,
perhaps just as important is another observation made plain by the experiences of
Germany, Japan and Nevada: changes to these laws are likely only to continue. This
is, of course, in part because the function of these laws is inextricably intertwined
with the solar industry, which itself is rapidly evolving. However, it is also due to two
fundamental tensions at the core of how these laws operate, namely, that they seek
to shift how electricity is produced, when there are incumbent interests that will
almost certainly resist that change — and that they bear the potential to increase
electricity prices, when a core objective of many energy laws is to keep costs down.
Because, moreover, these tensions are virtually inevitable in any deployment of solar
support laws, changes to them likely will be just as enduring.
A useful framework for considering the first tension is the mirror-image concepts
of the oft-invoked utility “death spiral”311 and the oft-exalted ideal of “grid parity.”312

308) See, e.g., Couture et al., supra note 63, at 99; Anatole Boute, A Comparative Analysis of
the European and Russian Support Schemes for Renewable Energy: Return on European
Experience for Russia, 4 J. of World Energy L. & Bus. 157, 174 (2011); Christa N.
Brunnschweiler, Finance for Renewable Energy: an Empirical Analysis of Developing and
Transition Economies, Env’t & Dev. Econ., at 241, 244ದ45 n.8 (Jan. 2010); Dörte Fouquet,
Policy Instruments for Renewable Energy—From a European Perspective, Renewable
Energy (forthcoming 2012); del Río González, supra note 122, at 2928; Julieta SchallenbergRodriguez & Reinhard Haas, Fixed Feed-in Tariffs Versus Premium: A Review of the
Current Spanish System, 16 Renewable & Sustainable Energies 293, 294 (2011).
309) See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
310) For more on the shifts occurring in the electricity sectors today, see Benjamin K. Sovacool,
How Long Will It Take? Conceptualizing the Temporal Dynamics of Energy Transitions,
13 Energy Research & Soc. Sci. 202, 202-15 (2016).
311) Frank A. Felder & Rasika Athawale, The Life and Death of the Utility Death Spiral, 27 Elec.
J. 9, 12-15 (2014).
312) Arne Olson & Ryan Jones, Chasing Grid Parity: Understanding the Dynamic Value of
Renewable Energy, 25 Elec. J. 17, 18-19 (2012).
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Although these concepts bear sophisticated names, in actuality they capture
straightforward ideas. The utility death spiral represents the theory that if a utility
begins losing revenue to customers who self-produce power, it will not be able to
recover its full costs of running the system, which means it will need to raise rates,
which will only further incentivize customers to leave, and the cycle of destruction
will continue, on and on.313 By contrast, the ideal of grid parity is the notion that once
a non-conventional resource can compete on its own volition with other resources,
it no longer will need legal or economic support.314 Until that day, however, support
policies must remain in place.
Of course, at the center of both of these ideas is the “prosumer” — the electricity
consumer who also produces her own energy.315 The prosumer is typified by a
residential or small business utility customer that installs and utilizes solar
photovoltaics. That is, prosumers are the archetypical targets, at least in part, of FIT
regimes, NEM programs, and other solar support mechanisms. They are the users of
distributed PV. They are thus also at the heart of the stories that unfolded in recent
decades in Germany, Japan, and Nevada.
At one level, the tension between the utility death spiral and grid parity is about
who produces electricity and how this product will be delivered. It is about the
tension between centralization and distribution, about the implicit desire for electricity
simply to be a background part of the global economic infrastructure, or instead, for
it to be a method of direct public participation and active democracy. In this vision,
the tension points up longstanding debates between and among values in the energy
system. It is, in one sense, part of the choice between, as Lovins would put it, “hard”
and “soft” energy paths.316
From another perspective, however, the tension is even more fundamental. It is
about the timeworn challenge between technological stability and disruption —
between one view of electricity as a private commodity and another as a public good.
This version of the tension, moreover, is almost as old as electricity technology
itself.317 That it is occurring in the twenty-first century with respect to solar power
313) Elisabeth Graffy & Steven Kihm, Does Disruptive Competition Mean a Death Spiral for
Electric Utilities?, 35 Energy L.J. 1, 2-4 (2014).
314) Olson & Jones, supra note 312, at 18-19.
315) Cherrelle Eida et al., The Economic Effect of Electricity Net-metering with Solar PV:
Consequences for Network Cost Recovery, Cross Subsidies and Policy Objectives, 75
Energy Pol’y 244, 245 (2014); see also, e.g., Yarel Parag & Benjamin K. Sovacool,
Electricity Market Design for the Prosumer Era, Nature Energy, at 1 (2016).
316) See generally Amory B. Lovins, Soft Energy Paths: Toward a Durable Peace (1979).
317) Compare, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877), with, e.g., Market St. Ry. Co. v. R.R.
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should be hardly surprising, even if it is quite telling: The tension is beyond difficult
to resolve because there is a strong argument that electricity is both public good and
private commodity.318
When seen from this vantage, the changes undergone by jurisdictions using solar
support mechanisms snap into sharp focus. Germany set out to transform its electricity
system with its EEG, and it has extensively done that, but when the cost of that
transformation became too great, its law had to relent — just as it had to be adjusted
repeatedly when its imperfect foresight could not keep up with the rapidly declining
costs of solar it had helped instigate.319 Likewise in Japan, the starts and stops to its
various solar support mechanisms can be explained at least in part by the tension
between trying to foment a disruption in the electricity system and the inertial effort
of incumbents to keep it the same.320 As one observer has noted about Japan, “The
success of solar PV has been accomplished relatively frictionless — without changing
any major institutional, industrial or organizational structures. . . . For the utilities,
solar is a lesser evil, as they do not want to let competing energy industries in, i.e.
wind.”321 Indeed, the sway of large utilities seems to have won out in Nevada, as its
new NEB scheme is more likely to promote large-scale solar installations — and
that, in fact, was part of the PUC’s rationale for lowering compensation to NEM
customers. Utility-scale solar, the PUC said, could be had at a cheaper price than
distributed solar.322
This distributed-versus-centralized solar divide, then, highlights both of the core
tensions at the heart of how solar support laws are implemented. The first is that
policies seeking to disrupt the extant system will receive — and have incurred —
resistance from those entrenched in the system. The second is related; it is that to the
extent these laws drive up costs, they will also receive resistance for that reason, both
from utilities and in the political sphere. Moreover, because solar power remains
above-marginal-cost with only a minority share of the generation sector, both of
these tensions will remain until true grid parity is obtained. In turn, so will the
pressure to change how these laws function.

318)

319)
320)
321)
322)

Comm’n of the State of California, 324 U.S. 548 (1945).
For one discussion of the different values of electricity generation, see Emily Hammond
& David B. Spence, The Regulatory Contract in the Marketplace, 69 Vand. L. Rev. 141,
173ದ214 (2016).
See supra Part IV.A.1.
See Moe, supra note 241, at 266-69.
Id. at 266, 269.
See supra Part IV.A.3.
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As a consequence, a core challenge for the future of solar support policies is the
need for lawmakers to manage the change that renewable energy support laws will
inescapably undergo. This is true both because of the fundamental tensions at the
center of how these laws operate and precisely because what they aim to do. While
these laws seek to create stability for the solar industry, they also foment change.
That change occurs in the very markets these laws target, which in turn act as a
feedback loop to the laws itself.323 In short, stability in this context may only be
elusive. Thus, finding ways to more actively engage in the process, including by
acting prospectively and ex ante, will strike a better path.
Of course, the way in which these legal changes will present problems may vary
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The overarching concern is that it will undermine
investor confidence, in turn slowing market growth. That chilling effect was
certainly the concern raised in Germany and Nevada. At the same time, modifying
legal regimes risks disrupting relationships built up between regulators, industry,
and customers, which clearly occurred in Nevada. But rapid or frequent modification
of support laws may impose other deleterious effects as well.
Perhaps the most important, cross-cutting example of this can be seen in how
jurisdictions choose to apply the modifications they make to their laws. While tumult
in a policy may be problematic enough, allowing such changes to reach backward
and unsettle expectations can only breed risk in the markets, undermining what solar
support mechanisms seek to achieve. Indeed, even a whiff of making changes
retroactively can cause concern from market actors, as was manifest in Germany’s
2009 amendments to its EEG, which were retroactive by mere weeks.324 It was even
more blatant in Nevada’s recent shift from NEM to NEB, where the PUC initially
refused to grandfather customers, only to relent after the fact following massive
pressure from solar companies, the public, and an expert commission appointed by
the governor.325 In short, these experiences reveal a key lesson about managing
change to solar support schemes specifically and renewable energy support
mechanisms in general: From a market risk perspective, considering retroactivity is
akin to toying with fire.
It is also critical to recognize that the effects of changes that occur in one legal
support regime will not be hermetically sealed within that jurisdiction’s geographic
boundaries. Rather, because markets are global, to some degree at least all solar
support laws function in a common ecosystem. Thus, the proposal in Nevada to move
from NEM to NEB ultimately can be traced to the engine that was the German EEG,
323) Cf. Davies & Allen, supra note 64, at 1002-04.
324) See id. at 956.
325) See Carley & Davies, supra note 33.
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which both spread the FIT idea to other countries and, by creating demand for solar,
helped drop its price so precipitously.326 Likewise for Japan, what tariff levels it
chooses to offer, and when it will be faced with pressure to modify them, will not be
shaped simply by internal politics and preferences but also by what is happening in
the global solar market more broadly. That is, no jurisdiction today is an island. For
renewable energy support as well as for other legislative problems, there are
extensive, if not always obvious or expected, cross-boundary interactions at play.
Some of these cross-jurisdictional effects will be positive. Indeed, solar prices have
plummeted globally precisely because demand in far-away jurisdictions has revved
up manufacturing in others. But some effects will necessarily be negative, such as
the increasing rapidity with which these policies continue to change, which has
proven to be a mutually reinforcing cycle.
In weighing the future of solar support, then, external forces must always be
considered.327 Today, those often relate most clearly to global efforts to combat
climate change, as well as to technological advances, cost reductions, and efforts to
promote green growth. Going forward, however, other factors, including energy
security, energy poverty, or others that today cannot even be predicted, may become
more pressing. The teaching, then, that lawmakers must manage change is not simply
a lesson that can be gleaned from the recent history of solar support, but rather, it is
also something that must not be forgotten in the future.

V. CONCLUSION
For the electricity system of the twenty-first century, solar power both holds great
promise and poses a significant threat. Its promise is that it will help transform the
system into a cleaner, more nimble, more democratic regime. The threat is that it will
achieve just that, upsetting the business models and plans of incumbents, in turn
unsettling the way this expensive, massive machine has been designed and deployed
over more than a century. In this debate about what the future should hold, it is
common for parties to take sides. The truth, of course, is more nuanced. While
alluring to some, the vision of a completely overhauled electricity system is not
beautiful and beautiful only. It also presents real risks to many, including potentially
making electricity much more expensive.
Critically, the role that solar is likely to play, or not play, in changing the global
electricity system is bound up in the legal tools used to promote the resource. This

326) See supra Part IV.A.1.
327) Cf. Davies & Allen, supra note 64, at 997-1004.
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Article has surveyed the four primary mechanisms used to date: net metering, feed-in
tariffs, RPSs, and tax and financial incentives. It also has identified key changes that
are rapidly occurring in these laws, including decreases in compensation for solar use
and the tethering of these legal tools to markets, primarily from the replacement of
FITs with FIPs, nascent changes from NEM to NEB, and the rapid rise of tendering
schemes. In so doing, the Article has provided a useful roadmap for understanding
the recent past of solar support laws. It also has provided a glimpse into the future,
by highlighting that core tensions in the operation of these laws are likely to persist,
and thus, that so too are the increasingly rapid changes to these laws. As a result, no
matter what specific role solar plays in global electricity systems going forward, a
core challenge — both for lawmakers and the solar industry itself — will be
managing, and dealing with, how these support mechanisms continue to evolve, as
they inevitably will.

